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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." This guaranty is not self-
executing, however, and the courts and criminal justice systems
in this country have long been bedeviled by questions concern-
ing appropriate methods of ensuring its observance. As a result
of the Supreme -Court's decisions in Weeks v. United States'
and Mapp v. Ohio,2 the method principally relied upon today is
a judicially created rule excluding from criminal trials evidence
obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights.
The search and seizure exclusionary rule is subject to a num-
ber of well-founded criticisms. First, the rule has no support in
the "original intent or meaning" of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. Second, the validity of the rule's deterrence rationale has
yet to be demonstrated. Third, among its other drawbacks, the
rule impairs significantly the search for truth in criminal justice.
Finally, alternative methods for deterring and redressing fourth
amendment violations exist or could be created, and those alter-
natives would be more effective and less costly than the exclu-
sionary rule.
A. History Of The Exclusionary Rule
The fourth amendment had its genesis in antipathy to Crown
search and seizure abuses under the general writs of the colonial
period, and the warrant clause is clearly a response to the abuses
of general writs. The addition of the search and seizure clause
may indicate a perception on the Framers' part that the warrant
clause alone would be insufficient to limit all abuses. The Fram-
ers did not consider the problem of warrantless searches in the
modern sense, as municipal police departments were a develop-
ment of the nineteenth century.
Through the mid-nineteenth century, the typical remedy for
an illegal search was a civil action for damages against the trans-
gressor. During the nineteenth century, courts followed the com-
mon law rule, which was to allow the products of illegal searches
and seizures into evidence. Indeed, it was not until Boyd v.
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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United States3 that an exclusionary rule was employed, and
there in a seizure of private papers case where the Court be-
lieved that the admission of the papers into evidence would vio-
late the fifth amendment.
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule made its debut in
Weeks v. United States,4 where the Supreme Court concluded
that fourth amendment protection would be "of no value" if ille-
gally seized letters and documents could be used as evidence
against their owner. A few years later, in Gouled v. United
States5 and Amos v. United States,' the Supreme Court rejected
the common-law rule in favor of inclusion and adopted the ex-
clusionary rule for illegal searches by persons acting under fed-
eral authority.
Over the next several decades, approximately one-third of the
states adopted the exclusionary rule. But in 1949 the Supreme
Court, in Wolf v. Colorado,7 squarely rejected the contention
that the suppression of evidence was vital to the protection of
fourth amendment rights as incorporated against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court began to overrule ear-
lier cases and substantially expand the reach of the exclusionary
rule. Elkins v. United States8 reversed earlier precedent and re-
jected the "silver platter" doctrine that had allowed the federal
government to use in its prosecutions evidence illegally obtained
by state authorities. Then, in Mapp v. Ohio,9 the Supreme Court
overruled Wolf and applied the exclusionary rule to the states.
Mapp grounded the rule in both the fourth and fifth amend-
ments and in the rule's supposed effect in deterring constitu-
tional violations. During the next several years the Warren
Court gradually extended the reach of the rule. By the late
1960s, with legal and public criticism mounting, the Court began
a slow process of first refusing to extend, and later limiting, the
scope of the rule. In 1984, the Supreme Court decided three im-
portant exclusionary rule cases. In United States v. Leon 0 and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard," the Court held that the exclusion-
ary rule does not bar the use of evidence seized by officers acting
3. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 255 U.S. 292 (1921).
6. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
7. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
11. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by
a detached and neutral magistrate, but subsequently found to be
unsupported by probable cause. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 2 the
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to illegal searches
and seizures by immigration agents that yield evidence for use in
deportation proceedings. In these cases, the Court expressly re-
jected any claim that the exclusionary rule is required by the
Constitution, and characterized even the "supervisory role" over
law-enforcement conduct as something best left to the political
branches of government.
B. Arguments For And Against The Exclusionary Rule
At least since the time Cardozo asked whether the "criminal is
to go free because the constable has blundered, 11 3 the exclusion-
ary rule has been defended on two major grounds. Beginning
with Weeks, many courts have argued that the rule is a neces-
sary means of "preserving judicial integrity." This rationale is
rooted in the "principle" that a court that accepts tainted evi-
dence effectively ratifies the violation by which such evidence
was obtained, and thereby taints itself and the justice system as
a whole. Although this rationale was embraced by the Supreme
Court in Mapp, and still appears in the opinions of some dis-
senting justices, it has apparently been abandoned as an inde-
pendent justification by the Court in recent years. Instead, the
Court has justified the continuation of the rule on the theory
that it deters fourth amendment violations by removing the in-
centive for official misconduct.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent opinions the Su-
preme Court has evaluated suppression questions by weighing
whether exclusion in a particular context would result in suffi-
cient deterrence of future misconduct to counterbalance the cost
to society in freeing the guilty. It was exactly this "balancing"
approach that led to the "good faith" exceptions in Sheppard
and Leon.
Despite a general lack of empirical evidence on the effect of
the exclusionary rule in deterring violations, courts have often
simply assumed that the rule deters fourth amendment viola-
tions, and have justified suppression on this assumption. At
best, however, available evidence indicates the deterrent value of
12. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
13. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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the rule to be problematic. Commentators have argued that it
affects police officers indirectly, if at all, and that officers often
do not receive information adequate to bring their conduct into
compliance with the fourth amendment standards articulated by
the courts. Supporters of the exclusionary rule respond that the
rule has made the criminal justice system as a whole more aware
of, and sensitive to, search and seizure standards.
The "cost" of the exclusionary rule to society is, most clearly,
the release of obviously guilty criminals. This is a serious matter,
even though it appears that only a relatively small fraction of
cases is lost as a consequence of successful suppression motions.
Less clear is the effect of the rule on decisions not to prosecute
and upon plea-bargaining. Prosecutors may well be less likely to
prosecute where there are potential search and seizure problems.
These are not the only arguments against the exclusionary
rule. Other claimed disadvantages of the rule are that it excludes
especially reliable and probative evidence; it diminishes respect
for the entire system of justice; it benefits only the guilty; it may
encourage police and judicial misconduct to circumvent the sup-
pression sanction; it discourages the search for alternatives; and
it distorts the allocation of judicial and criminal justice
resources.
Aside from these policy concerns, there is a substantial consti-
tutional objection to the continued application of the rule to the
states. The Supreme Court has disclaimed any constitutional re-
quirement for the exclusionary rule and concedes that it is
merely a "prophylactic" rule imposed by the courts in the exer-
cise of "supervisory power." Yet the Supreme Court has never
claimed any supervisory power over state courts. Thus, it is an
anomaly for the Court to continue to apply to the states a rule
that is not constitutionally mandated.
More fundamentally, critics claim, the exclusionary rule at all
levels is objectionable under the very rationale maintained by
the Court. The argument that exclusion is justified upon a con-
sideration of costs and benefits, and of the lack of alternative
deterrents and remedies, is undercut by the reality of in-place
alternatives and the possibilities of other, less costly, methods of
enforcing fourth amendment rights.
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C. Other Methods Of Preventing And Redressing Fourth
Amendment Violations
No other nation, including those with a common-law heritage,
has adopted an American-style exclusionary rule solution to the
problem of illegally seized evidence, although Canada recently
amended its charter to provide its courts with discretion to sup-
press evidence in certain cases of constitutional violations. Other
nations, including England and West Germany, allow suppres-
sion in certain cases of egregious misconduct, but these nations
and others generally prefer to rely upon a variety of civil actions
and administrative remedies (and sometimes criminal penalties)
to deter and punish police misconduct.
Within the United States, a number of alternatives to the ex-
clusionary rule are available to deter and punish fourth amend-
ment violations. Under certain circumstances an officer may be
subject to criminal penalties under state or federal law. To date,
however, criminal penalties have not been used widely. This may
be due in part to a reluctance to punish police so severely, or
more probably-at least at the federal level-to the lack of cases
involving willful or malicious misconduct.
A number of administrative tools have also been developed to
prevent and punish violations, including comprehensive officer
training and education, rules and regulations, internal law en-
forcement investigations of alleged abuse, and disciplinary mea-
sures for violations. For example, all non-FBI Department of
Justice law enforcement officers are subject to the provisions of
Department of Justice Order 1752.1A, which specifies discipline
for a number of offenses, including violations of rules governing
searches and seizures.
In addition to existing criminal and administrative sanctions,
some commentators have suggested toughening procedures in
this area by encouraging the development of independent review
boards. Such boards would review allegations of police miscon-
duct outside the forum of prosecution of the accused. They
would have authority to investigate and punish abusers and,
perhaps, to refer cases for criminal prosecution in instances of
serious misconduct. Another alternative, occasionally employed
in the past, is injunctive relief against police departments and
law enforcement entities engaged in a systematic pattern of
search and seizure violations.
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has revolution-
ized the law relating to constitutional torts, resulting in increas-
Search and Seizure
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ing numbers of civil damage actions in instances of alleged con-
stitutional violations. Beginning with Monroe v. Pape," the
Court has greatly expanded the scope of liability of state and
local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including liability for ille-
gal searches and seizures. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics," the Supreme Court
created a similar direct cause of action for damages by victims of
illegal searches against federal officers. Since 1971 some 12,000
Bivens suits have been filed against federal employees-though
very few of these appear to have been cases of alleged fourth
amendment violations.
In 1974 Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) to permit suits directly against the government for
fourth amendment violations, though the remedy evidently has
not been widely used to date. Damages may also be sought by
victims of illegal wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
While each of these civil actions provides an alternative to the
exclusionary rule, none is entirely satisfactory. Among their
drawbacks are the problems of subjecting law enforcement of-
ficers to enormous potential personal liability, the encourage-
ment of spurious lawsuits, and the prospect that such actions
may have a chilling effect on law enforcement.
Replacing the exclusionary rule with some combination of
other deterrents and/or remedies is one approach to reform. But
a number of commentators and jurists have suggested ways to
modify or curtail the exclusionary rule, and thereby reduce its
costs, without abandoning it entirely. For example, the Adminis-
tration has supported the enactment of legislation expanding the
"good faith" exception to cover non-warrant cases. The Chief
Justice, among others, has suggested not using the exclusionary
rule for the most serious types of crime. Other approaches would
save the suppression remedy for only the most serious forms of
police misconduct.
D. A Suggested Approach To Fourth Amendment Violations
In light of the serious problems caused by the exclusionary
rule, and the availability of less costly means of redressing and
deterring fourth amendment violations, the Office of Legal Pol-
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
15. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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icy recommends that the Department pursue a policy designed
to result in the abolition of the exclusionary rule.
In recent years the Supreme Court has grown increasingly dis-
enchanted with the rule as a solution for search and seizure vio-
lations. It has generally refused to expand the scope of the rule,
and, in Leon and Sheppard, created a significant exception to it.
Individual Justices have called for the development of alterna-
tives in Congress and by the states.
In this environment, it is important to take advantage of the
Court's increasing lack of confidence in the utility of the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent to police misconduct, to highlight the
costs of continued reliance upon the rule, and to persuade the
Court that alternatives exist that effectively redress and deter
violations.
E. Conclusions And Recommendations
The Office of Legal Policy recommends a program of legisla-
tive, litigative, and administrative initiatives to abolish the ex-
clusionary rule. With regard to legislation, the Department
should encourage an amendment to S. 237, the principal exclu-
sionary rule bill pending in Congress, that would abolish the
rule. We should also support amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims Act to make the United States the exclusive defendant in
suits based on constitutional torts by federal employees. The en-
actment of such a statute might help convince the Supreme
Court that viable alternatives to the rule were in place.
On the litigative front, the Department should urge the Court
to end the application of the rule in federal and state prosecu-
tions. If possible, the vehicle should be a case involving a fourth
amendment violation which does not feature intentional or will-
ful misconduct and which would allow the Court to go beyond
the context of objective "good faith" conduct by the officers.
In the administrative area, the Department should actively
publicize the effectiveness of existing administrative practices,
and should review those practices to find how they might be
strengthened without detriment to fair and effective law
enforcement.
Finally, the Department should consider commissioning or un-
dertaking empirical research on the effectiveness of existing civil
remedies, and the degree to which the need to resolve suppres-
sion motions now burdens thd system. The results of such stud-
ies could be used to persuade the courts of the high cost of the
Search and Seizure
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THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
For nearly 100 years after the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment, the courts were rarely called upon to consider the ques-
tion of how its prohibitions should be enforced. Over the past
century, however, this question has become one of the criminal
law's most predominant and enduring issues and, in recent
years, it has commanded the expenditure of extraordinary
amounts of time and energy by participants in the nation's crim-
inal justice system, to say nothing of the attention it has re-
ceived from legal scholars and other commentators. This Report
'discusses the provisions of law that have been developed to de-
ter and redress fourth amendment violations by federal law en-
forcement officers, argues that there is a need to reform those
provisions, and suggests a possible approach to that end.
A. Issues Presented By Fourth Amendment Violations
When evidence of criminal conduct is obtained by means of a
search or seizure conducted in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, three separate issues arise: (1) whether to permit use of
,the evidence at trial; (2) how to prevent such unlawful conduct
in the future; and (3) how to compensate the victim of the
fourth amendment violation. The first issue implicates primarily
the interests of society in deciding guilt or innocence in criminal
cases efficiently and on the basis of all probative, reliable, and
non-privileged evidence available. The second issue involves the
'interest of society in deterring unreasonable searches and
;seizures in a manner that does not discourage fearless and vigor-
ous law enforcement. The third issue concerns primarily the in-
dividual's interest in obtaining redress for damages suffered as a
result of an unconstitutional intrusion.
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B. Synopsis Of Current Federal Law
Current federal law addresses these issues and interests
through a combination of judicial, legislative, and administrative
provisions. The principal components of current law are: the ex-
clusionary rule, which exists primarily to deter fourth amend-
ment violations; civil remedies, which are intended partly to de-
ter but primarily to provide redress for such violations; and
administrative practices, which are designed to prevent and
punish unlawful searches and seizures.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created limitation on the
use of probative and reliable evidence of guilt in criminal trials.
Under the rule as it has been developed by the Supreme Court,
such evidence may not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief
if it was acquired in violation of the fourth amendment rights of
the accused, unless the responsible law enforcement officers were
acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant subse-
quently determined to be invalid. Prior to the adoption of this
rule, relevant, non-privileged evidence was admissible in a fed-
eral criminal proceeding regardless of how it was obtained by
the government. At the time it adopted the rule, and for a num-
ber of years thereafter, the Supreme Court relied on several jus-
tifications, including arguments that the rule was necessary to
protect fourth amendment rights and to avoid creating the ap-
pearance that the judiciary condoned fourth amendment viola-
tions. All but one of these rationales have given way over time,
and today the deterrence rationale appears to be the Court's sole
justification for retaining the exclusionary rule.
A person who is subjected to an unlawful search and seizure
conducted by a federal law enforcement officer has several ave-
nues of redress under existing federal law. First, if the fourth
amendment violation results in a criminal prosecution, redress
of sorts is provided by the exclusionary rule itself-unless the
officer was acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant,
the person is entitled to have excluded from the government's
direct case any evidence obtained as a result of the constitu-
tional violation. Second, whether or not the violation leads to
prosecution, the aggrieved person can sue the responsible of-
ficers for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics;16 or, if the violation involves
unlawful electronic surveillance, he can sue under 18 U.S.C.
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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§ 2520. Third, the victim of an unlawful search or seizure may
also bring a tort action for damages against the federal govern-
ment under a 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Administrative mechanisms for preventing and punishing
fourth amendment violations by federal law enforcement officers
include education in the law of search and seizure, rules and reg-
ulations governing investigative and law enforcement activity
that implicates fourth amendment interests, and disciplinary
procedures and sanctions for conduct in violation of the rules
and regulations.
C. Summary
Part I of this Report traces the history of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule. This portion of the paper begins with a
brief discussion of "original intent," showing that the Framers of
the Constitution had no expectation that the fourth amendment
would be enforced by excluding reliable and probative evidence
from criminal trials. The origins and development of the sup-
pression doctrine are then reviewed, as are the major Supreme
Court cases that reflect the ebb and flow of its application over
the years. The most important of these are the decisions that
established the exclusionary rule in the federal system (Boyd
and Weeks), that extended the fourth amendment, but not the
exclusionary rule, to the states (Wolf), that applied the suppres-
sion doctrine to the states (Mapp), that carved out a "good
faith" exception for searches based on invalid warrants (Leon),
and that refused to apply the rule in deportation proceedings, in
part because of the government's voluntary efforts to prevent
and punish fourth amendment violations (Lopez-Mendoza). Fi-
nally, Part I summarizes the rule's current precarious position in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions and legislative activity
in Congress.
Part II sets forth briefly the principal arguments in the debate
over the merits of the exclusionary rule. The two major justifica-
tions offered for the rule are that it preserves the integrity of the
courts and that it deters fourth amendment violations. The prin-
cipal opposing arguments are that the rule excludes the most re-
'liable evidence from criminal trials, causes the release or lenient
treatment of guilty defendants, erodes public respect for the law,
squanders scarce criminal justice resources, and imposes other
unnecessary costs and burdens on the criminal justice system.
Search and Seizure
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Part III examines methods, other than the exclusionary rule,
for preventing and redressing fourth amendment violations. This
portion of the Report begins by reviewing the treatment of un-
lawful searches and seizures in three other countries-England
and Canada, which share the common law heritage of the United
States, and the Federal Republic of Germany, which does not.
There follows a discussion of various alternatives that exist or
that might be adopted in the federal system to prevent and rem-
edy fourth amendment violations. These approaches include
criminal prosecutions, existing and proposed administrative
practices, the use of equitable remedies, and reliance on statu-
tory and non-statutory civil suits for damages. Part III con-
cludes with a review of three proposals to curtail the application
of the exclusionary rule-by making the "good faith" exception
applicable to warrantless searches, by applying the rule only in
cases involving less serious crimes, and by limiting suppression
to instances of egregious fourth amendment violations.
Part IV argues that the exclusionary rule should be abolished
entirely, rather than simply reduced in scope. There are serious
obstacles to achieving this goal through legislation, but the Su-
preme Court might be persuaded to abolish the rule on the
ground that there exist less costly but no less effective alterna-
tives for achieving deterrence and redress. Also analyzed in Part
IV are proposed alternatives for achieving deterrence and re-
dress in the event of abolition of the rule. In addition, this Part
describes several initiatives that could be taken by the Adminis-
tration to pave the way for abolition. These include efforts to
focus public attention on the prophylactic and punitive aspects
of existing federal administrative policies and practices in the
fourth amendment area, as well as efforts to strengthen the de-
terrent potential of these provisions, perhaps by creating a re-
view board within the Executive Branch to examine all question-
able searches and seizures and to impose appropriate
disciplinary measures when warranted. Also discussed are possi-
ble amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act to make it a
more attractive remedial device, perhaps by allowing awards of
liquidated damages. In addition, empirical studies of the opera-
tion of these alternative mechanisms could be undertaken to
demonstrate that adequate deterrence and redress can be
achieved by methods less costly than the exclusionary rule.
The body of the Report concludes with a summary of recom-
mended legislative, litigative, and administrative initiatives that
the Department should undertake to eliminate the rule com-
pletely from federal and state criminal proceedings. These in-
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clude supporting Congressional efforts to abolish the rule and to
create an exclusive damage remedy against the United States in
its stead; arguing in appropriate Supreme Court cases that the
rule is unnecessary and unwise in the federal system and that
there is no sound doctrinal basis for its imposition in state cases;
and undertaking "outreach" efforts and empirical research to
support the goal of total abolition.
Finally, included in Appendix B is a brief description of a
sample of exclusionary rule cases that illustrate the rule's absurd
and potentially dangerous consequences.
I. HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The rule that reliable and probative physical evidence of guilt
may not be introduced in the prosecution's case-in-chief if it was
obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights was unknown to the law in this country for almost 100
years after the fourth amendment was adopted. This section re-
views the origins and development of the exclusionary rule,
traces the ebb and flow of its application over the past thirty
years, and describes its current precarious status.
A. The Framers' Original Intentions And The Exclusionary
Rule
The exclusionary rule is not mentioned in the Constitution.
Indeed, it was not until nearly a century after the ratification of
the fourth amendment that courts began to suppress evidence as
a remedy for constitutional violations. Scholars generally agree
on the historical background of the origin of the fourth amend-
ment. The relevant history indicates that while the Framers
were greatly concerned about wrongful searches, the practice of
their time did not include the exclusion of evidence as a remedy
for such searches, and it does not appear that the Framers or
ratifiers of the fourth amendment contemplated suppression as a
remedy for its violation.
Unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights, which grew out
of more ancient principles of English jurisprudence, the fourth
amendment developed particularly as a reaction against abuses
Search and Seizure
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leading to the American Revolution. 17 During the 1760s, wide-
spread colonial opposition developed to the Crown's use of gen-
eral warrants and writs of assistance. General warrants were is-
sued by royal officers and gave officials carte blanche to search
anywhere for anything. Writs of assistance were similar but were
authorized by Parliament rather than the Crown. The colonists
viewed both as illegal because they authorized the search of pri-
vate residences without probable cause. 8 There was resistance
to this practice in both English and colonial courts. In the case
of Entick v. Carrington0 damages of three hundred pounds
were awarded in favor of a pamphleteer whose premises were
ransacked by officers acting under a general warrant. The deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal. In the American colonies, attempts
to enforce general warrants were sometimes met with violent
resistance. 0
Against this backdrop a number of the newly independent
states placed prohibitions against general warrants in their state
declarations of rights. In 1776, Virginia's Bill of Rights prohib-
ited general warrants, as did the Declarations of Rights soon
thereafter adopted by Maryland and North Carolina. Pennsylva-
nia and Vermont announced a general right of their people to
"hold themselves, their homes, and their papers and possessions
free from search and seizure" in the absence of proper warrants.
In 1780, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights first used the
phrasing "unreasonable searches and seizures" that was later to
become part of the fourth amendment.2
It appears that the principal concern of the colonists and of
the early state legislatures was the problem of general warrants,
rather than official misconduct in what we today think of as the
"warrantless search" area. This focus was natural. Municipal po-
lice departments were a development of the nineteenth century.
Other than those conducted at a person's premises, most
searches for criminal evidence in the eighteenth century were
made incident to arrest following hot pursuit or the "hue and
cry," or incident to execution of an arrest warrant.2 2
17. See Rader, Legislating a Remedy for the Fourth Amendment, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 585,
590 (1982).
18. See Harris, Back to Basics: An Examination of the Exclusionary Rule in Light
of Common Sense and the Supreme Court's Original Search and Seizure Jurispru-
dence, 37 ARK. L. REV. 646 (1983).
19. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
20. See Rader, supra note 17, at 595-96.
21. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather than an Empirical Proposition?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571-79 (1983).
22. Id. at 571-72.
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In the First Congress, James Madison, who led the fight for a
bill of rights, initially proposed an amendment on the subject of
search and seizure that spoke directly only to the problem of
general warrants. Madison's proposal was sent to the Committee
of Eleven, which reported a modified version of the proposal
t-hat placed even greater emphasis on warrant procedure by
dropping Madison's mention of "unreasonable searches and
,seizures." One member of the House, Congressman Benson of
New York, objected that the measure was insufficient, but his
motion to add a separate provision addressing unreasonable
searches apart from the warrant requirement was defeated.
However, after the inchoate Bill of Rights was referred to a com-
mittee (on which Benson served) "to arrange the amendments,"
the language establishing the unreasonable search and seizure
clause was restored and subsequently approved by the. full
House. It is not altogether clear to what degree the Congress
thought the two clauses were linked."'
It is also not clear to what extent the Framers contemplated
,enforcement mechanisms. The warrant clause is the only express
device against wrongful searches mentioned in the amendment
itself, although it is probable that Madison and the many law-
yers in Congress at the time were fully aware that in Entick and
,other celebrated cases a trespass action for damages had won
judicial approval as a remedy for those injured by an illegal
search.
Several early Supreme Court cases shed some light on search
and seizure enforcement in the decades following ratification. In
Gelston v. Hoyt24 Justice Story explicated federal search and
seizure principles in a case involving the condemnation and sub-
sequent search of a ship. After restating the common-law princi-
ple that anyone might seize property at his peril, Story ex-
plained that since a condemnation court in the case had,
subsequent to the seizure, refused to issue a certificate of proba-
ble cause to immunize the officers involved, and the forfeiture
was thus not upheld, the defendants were liable for trespass and
must respond to the ship's owners in damages. 25 In a subsequent
decision the Supreme Court held that there was no liability
where seized goods were actually subject to forfeiture, notwith-
standing possible irregularities in the search procedure itself.26
23. See Rader, supra note 17, at 587-90.
24. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
25. See Harris, supra note 18, at 657-61.
26. Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 342 (1842).
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These and other early cases27 may be read together for the pro-
position that in the early American republic,
searches of private premises generally required warrants.
In all other circumstances warrants were unnecessary.
Any person, including a private citizen acting entirely on
his own, could search and seize at his peril. If the search
uncovered contraband or property otherwise subject to
forfeiture, then he was completely justified. If, however,
the search proved fruitless, then the party who made the
search was liable for damages unless he could find the
shelter of a statute. A search conducted in good faith
pursuant to statutory authority was considered
reasonable.28
The Framers do not seem to have considered suppression as a
remedy for unconstitutional searches. They were, however,
aware of the remedies available in the law of their time. It seems
fair to infer that they believed these remedies adequate, at least
for the problems of their era.
B. The Common Law Rule
Under the common law rule, which was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Adams v. New York, 29 a defendant could not
object at trial to the use of evidence obtained in violation of his
rights under the fourth amendment. The rationale for this rule
was straightforward and sensible-as the court stated in Com-
monwealth v. Dana:
Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were ille-
gally seized, still this is no legal objection to the admis-
sion of them in evidence. If the search warrant were ille-
gal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his
authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant is-
sued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong
done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers
seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue.
27. E.g., The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824) (officers not immune from lia-
bility when ship acquitted in condemnation proceeding even where probable cause ex-
isted); Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197 (1845) (customs officer immune
where goods seized had been fraudulently imported even if seizure had been irregular).
28. Harris, supra note 18, at 647.
29. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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When papers are offered in evidence, the court can take
no notice how they are obtained, whether lawfully or
unlawfully."0
C. Origins Of The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule had its genesis in two cases involving
the use of private papers as evidence against the owner at trial.
In the first case, Boyd v. United States,31 the owner of goods
that were the subject of federal forfeiture proceedings complied
with a pretrial order to produce an invoice relating to the goods,
but objected on fourth and fifth amendment grounds. Noting
the "intimate relation" between the two amendments,3 2 the Su-
preme Court concluded that the invoice should not have been
ordered to be produced or admitted as evidence because its com-
pulsory production required the owner of the goods to be a wit-
ness against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
In dicta, the Court added that this manner of acquiring evidence
also constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the fourth amendment.
In the second case, Weeks v. United States,33 evidence intro-
duced at the trial of a defendant charged with using the mails to
transmit lottery tickets included letters and other private docu-
ments seized by United States Marshals during a warrantless
search of his home. The Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant's pretrial motion for return of the papers-based on both
the fourth and fifth amendments-should have been granted be-
cause seizure of the papers violated the fourth amendment. Al-
though Weeks is often regarded as the case that imposed the
exclusionary rule on the federal courts, its actual holding did not
extend significantly beyond Boyd. The true significance of
Weeks lay in the Court's sole reliance on the fourth amendment,
in its view that "[t]he tendency of those who execute the crimi-
nal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlaw-
ful seizure .. .should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts, '13 4 and in its conclusion that the protections of the fourth
amendment would be "of no value" if letters and documents
30. 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841).
31. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
32. Id. at 633.
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34. Id. at 392.
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could be seized unlawfully and used as evidence against the
owner.
3 5
D. Exclusionary Rule Developments Prior To Wolf
Two decisions in 1921 firmly established the exclusionary rule
in the federal courts. In Gouled v. United States,36 the Court
unanimously rejected the common law rule previously affirmed
in Adams that prevented a criminal defendant from objecting at
trial to the manner in which the government had obtained its
evidence. That rule, the Court reasoned, was merely procedural
and, therefore, should not prevail over a constitutional right."
And in Amos v. United States,38 decided the same day as
Gouled, the Court held that whiskey seized unlawfully from the
defendant's home should have been excluded from evidence. By
making it clear that private papers are not the only things that
may be inadmissible on fourth amendment grounds, this deci-
sion began a trend of focusing on the manner in which the gov-
ernment obtained its evidence rather than on the nature of the
evidence.
Because the exclusionary rule that developed in Weeks and its
progeny was based on the fourth amendment, the Court limited
its scope to persons acting under federal authority, and did not
apply it to searches by state officials." Under that approach, the
so-called "silver platter doctrine," federal courts could admit ev-
idence that had been illegally seized by state officers. Similarly,
the Court declined to apply the rule to evidence obtained by
means of illegal conduct that did not violate the fourth
amendment."
Among the states, the number of jurisdictions adopting the
exclusionary rule under state constitutions increased steadily
following Weeks. In People v. Marxhausen," Michigan became
the first state after Weeks to adopt an exclusionary rule for vio-
lations of search and seizure requirements. By 1949, 47 states
had passed on the Weeks doctrine. Of these, 16 had adopted it
35. Id. at 393.
36. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
37. Id. at 312.
38. 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
39. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (search conducted by policeman not acting under any
claim of federal authority).
40. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (non-trespassory wiretap).
41. 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919).
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and the remaining 31, including Iowa-which had been the only
state to adopt an exclusionary rule prior to Weeks-had rejected
it.42
E. Wolf v. Colorado
In Wolf v. Colorado,43 the Supreme Court held that, although
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment incorpo-
rated the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it did not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by such unlawful methods in a state court prosecution
for a state crime. After explaining that the Weeks rule was not
derived from the explicit requirements of the fourth amendment
or from a legislative expression of Congressional policy, but
rather was a matter of judicial implication, the Court advanced
two reasons for not extending it to the states. First, the Court
said, the remedy of exclusion could not be considered vital to
protection of the fourth amendment right to privacy-applicable
to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment-in light of
the 31-16 margin of rejection of the exclusionary rule by the
states and the failure of any jurisdiction in the British Common-
wealth to adopt the rule. Second, the Court pointed out, the
states that had rejected the Weeks doctrine had provided other
means of protecting privacy, such as private civil actions and po-
lice discipline, that if consistently enforced would be equally ef-
fective. In this connection, the Court observed that the reasons
for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by federal agents
were less compelling in the case of the state or local police be-
cause community opinion could be exerted far more effectively
on the latter than on the former. Finally, the Court observed
that if Congress were to pass a statute purporting to negate the
Weeks doctrine "[wle would be faced with the problem of the
respect to be accorded the legislative judgment on an issue as to
which, in default of that judgment, we have been forced to de-
pend upon our own."
42. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949).
43. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
44. Id. at 33.
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F. Expansion Of The Exclusionary Rule
Beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court rendered a series of de-
cisions that substantially expanded the scope of the exclusionary
rule. First, in Elkins v. United States,"s the Court reexamined
and rejected the "silver platter" doctrine established in Weeks;
it held that federal courts could not admit evidence illegally
seized by state officers. The opinion by Justice Stewart stated
that the exclusionary rule "is calculated to prevent, not to re-
pair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it.""8 Although acknowledging the
absence of empirical statistics to demonstrate the rule's effec-
tiveness in this regard, Justice Stewart observed that the rule
had not produced untoward consequences in the federal system
and that the movement among state courts toward exclusion
seemed inexorable, and invoked considerations of federalism and
the imperative of judicial integrity.
Then, in Mapp v. Ohio,4 7 the Court overruled Wolf and held
that evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure is inad-
missible in a state criminal trial.48 The Court first disposed of
the factual considerations relied on in Wolf, pointing out that
more than half the states that had passed on the question after
Wolf had wholly or partially adopted or adhered to the Weeks
rule, and that the other remedies discussed in Wolf had proven
"worthless and futile.' 49
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Clark advanced four jus-
tifications for imposing the exclusionary rule on the states. First,
he said, the exclusionary rule is necessary to ensure the actual
enjoyment of fourth amendment rights by-as explained in El-
kins-removing the incentive to violate constitutional guaran-
tees. Second, he argued, the close relationship between the
fourth amendment and the fifth amendment's prohibition on co-
erced confessions requires exclusion of what is tantamount to co-
45. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
46. Id. at 217.
47. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48. Prior to Mapp, illegally seized evidence was admissible in 24 states. See Elkins,
364 U.S. at 224-25 (Appendix to the Opinion of the Court). Since then, as a result of
Mapp, all of these states have been compelled to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment. While some of these states would probably have adopted the
exclusionary rule in any event, it seems likely that others would not have done so. See
e.g., State v. Hill, 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829 (1964) (adhering to Mapp only with ex-
press reluctance).
49. 367 U.S. at 651-52.
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erced testimony-unconstitutionally seized goods, papers, ef-
fects, or documents. Third, Justice Clark claimed that
application of the exclusionary rule to the states would promote
federal-state cooperation in solving crime in accordance with
constitutional standards. Finally, he argued that the imperative
of judicial integrity required application of the rule to the states.
Two years after Mapp, the Court extended the exclusionary
rule to verbal statements that are the "fruits" of an unlawful
search.' 0 Then, in 1965, the Court held that the rule should be
applied in forfeiture proceedings." The latter case represents
the high-water mark of the exclusionary rule. Thereafter, the
Court began to narrow its application by placing ever increasing
emphasis on the rule's deterrent purpose as opposed to other
justifications that had been offered for it, and by balancing its
apparent costs against its presumed benefits.
G. Limitations On The Reach Of The Exclusionary Rule
In Linkletter v. Walker,'52 the Court decided that Mapp
should not be applied retroactively because retroactivity would
not serve the rule's deterrent purpose and would impose signifi-
cant costs on the administration of justice.
In almost every case concerning the scope of the exclusionary
rule since Linkletter, the Court has been guided by considera-
tions of deterrence and has employed a balancing approach in
deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule. Thus, in Alder-
man v. United States,'53 the Court stressed the deterrence ra-
tionale, but indicated that the fourth amendment does not man-
date every measure that deters illegal searches. Adopting a
balancing approach, the Court concluded that the public interest
in having all relevant and probative evidence submitted to the
factfinder outweighed whatever additional deterrence would re-
sult from extending the protection of the exclusionary rule to
,defendants whose rights had not been violated by the unlawful
search.
Five years later, in United States v. Calandra,54 the Court
took the same approach in refusing to require exclusion of un-
lawfully obtained evidence from grand jury proceedings. Con-
50. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
51. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
52. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
53. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
54. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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struing the exclusionary rule not as a personal constitutional
right but rather as a judicial remedy created principally to deter
unlawful police conduct, the Court balanced the potential injury
to the role of the grand jury against the marginal deterrence to
be gained by applying the rule to grand jury proceedings, and
concluded that such an extension of the rule was not warranted.
Similar reasoning in subsequent cases resulted in decisions
that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the use of illegally
obtained evidence in a variety of other contexts: to impeach tes-
timony by a criminal defendant on cross-examination; 5 in civil
proceedings to collect federal wagering taxes;56 or in civil depor-
tation proceedings.57 Stone v. Powell" applied this balancing ap-
proach to determine that the rule does not provide a basis for
granting federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who had
ample opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the
state courts.
H. Good Faith Reliance Upon A Warrant
Until 1984, most of the Court's decisions limiting the scope of
the exclusionary rule involved the admissibility of illegally
seized evidence in proceedings collateral to the criminal prosecu-
tion itself; none concerned the paradigmatic exclusionary rule
case of use of such evidence in the prosecutor's case-in-chief
against the victim of the fourth amendment violation. United
States v. Leon" and Massachusetts v. Sheppard" presented
two such cases. In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary
rule does not bar use in the government's direct case of evidence
seized by law enforcement officers acting in objectively reasona-
ble reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate but subsequently found to be unsupported by
probable cause."
The linchpin of the Leon decision is the Court's analysis of
the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule under
55. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
56. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
57. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
58. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
59. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
60. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
61. Having decided this issue in Leon, the only question for the Court in Sheppard
was whether the officers reasonably believed that the search they conducted was author-
ized by a valid warrant. The Court concluded that "the police conduct in this case
clearly was objectively reasonable and largely error-free." 468 U.S. at 990.
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the circumstances presented. The "substantial social costs" cited
by the court were the rule's interference with the truthfinding
functions of judge and jury, the consequent freeing or unduly
lenient treatment of guilty defendants, and the resultant genera-
tion of disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.2
With respect to benefits, the Court rejected the argument that
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would signifi-
cantly deter errors by issuing judges and magistrates, and said
that, instead, if exclusion of such evidence is to have any deter-
rent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforce-
ment officers or the policies of their departments."6 Turning
then to situations in which officers have relied on a warrant ob-
tained in objective good faith, the Court noted that "[iln most
such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter
.... -Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations." 6' Thus, the Court concluded,
"the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subse-
quently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion."
65
I. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
On the same day it adopted a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule for warrant cases in Leon, the Court decided in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza" that the fruits of illegal searches and
seizures by INS agents are admissible in civil deportation pro-
ceedings. The Court reached this conclusion on the basis of the
usual cost-benefit analysis.
On the cost side of the ledger, the Court adverted generally to
"the loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary
costs that flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adju-
dication that therefore occurs, "67 as well as to the "unusual and
significant" costs of applying the rule in deportation proceed-
ings-the release from custody of persons who would then im-
mediately resume their commission of the crime of unlawful
62. 468 U.S. at 907-08.
-63. Id. at 916-18.
64. Id. at 920-21.
,65. Id. at 922.
66. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
,67. Id. at 1041.
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presence in the United States, and the burdens that the rule
would impose on the administration of the immigration laws. 8
With respect to benefits, the Court pointed to several factors
that it said reduced significantly the likely deterrent effect of
exclusion in the context presented. 9 Noting that "[d]eterrence
must be measured at the margin, '70 the Court concluded that
the balance between costs and benefits weighed against applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings, partic-
ularly in light of the "sensible and reasonable steps [already
taken by the INS] to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its
officers" and because application of the exclusionary rule would
lead to continuing criminal conduct on the part of illegal
aliens."
J. Current Status Of The Exclusionary Rule
The current status of the exclusionary rule in federal law can
best be described as precarious. All but one of the four theoreti-
cal pillars once used to justify the rule have been eroded, the
validity of the sole remaining justification has been cast in
doubt, and serious efforts are underway in Congress to limit the
rule substantially, if not to abandon it entirely.
By 1965, when the exclusionary rule was in its heyday, the
Court had suggested four principal bases for the rule: (1) the
relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments (e.g.,
Boyd); (2) the fourth amendment itself (e.g., Weeks, Wolf); (3)
the imperative of judicial integrity (e.g., Elkins, Mapp); and (4)
the necessity of deterring illegal police activity (e.g., Elkins,
Mapp). Beginning with Linkletter in 1965, however, the Court's
exclusionary rule decisions placed increasing emphasis on the
68. Id. at 1046-50.
69. The deterrence-reducing factors cited by the Court were: first, the weakness of
the threat of exclusion on the conduct of INS agents, since deportation would still often
be possible on the basis of untainted evidence; second, the improbability that the arrest-
ing officer would "shape his conduct in anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a
formal deportation hearing," because most illegal aliens arrested by the INS do not con-
test deportation; third, the existence within the INS of a "'comprehensive scheme for
deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers," involving "rules restricting stop,
interrogation, and arrest practices," "instruction and examination in Fourth Amendment
law," and "a procedure for investigating and punishing immigration officers who commit
Fourth Amendment violations"; and, fourth, the availability of alternative reme-
dies-principally, suits for declaratory relief-for institutional practices by the INS that
might violate fourth amendment rights. Id. at 1043-45.
70. Id. at 1045.
71. Id. at 1050.
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deterrence rationale. Moreover, by the mid-1970s, the Court had
rejected the theory that exclusion is a personal constitutional
right,7 2 and had come to view deterrence as "the 'prime purpose'
of the rule, if not the sole one."' "7 If there could be any doubt
that the deterrence rationale had supplanted the rule's other
justifications, that doubt was removed in Leon.7
4
However, the Court has recognized for some time that the de-
terrence rationale is a weak reed. It noted in Janis that "[n]o
empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet
been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a
deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now ap-
plied. 175 The Court reiterated this reservation in Leon as a pre-
lude to its conclusion that "even assuming that the rule effec-
tively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for
the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in
accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law en-
forcement activity. '76 Although the Court's holding in Leon was
limited to searches conducted pursuant to warrants and, there-
fore, was not as broad as this language would seem to permit,
this passage and other aspects of the Leon decision strongly sug-
gest that the Court may be inclined to extend the "reasonable
good faith mistake" doctrine to warrantless searches as well.
A second reason for questioning the vitality of the deterrence
rationale relates to the "benefit" side of the cost-benefit analysis
that the Court has adopted in deciding whether to apply the ex-
clusionary rule in various contexts-including the context of use
of unlawfully seized evidence in the government's case-in-chief,
as in Leon. On at least two occasions, most recently in Leon, the
Court has intimated that-even with respect to substantial and
deliberate violations of the fourth amendment-its failure to
question the continued application of the exclusionary rule is
contingent on "the absence of a more efficacious sanction.
'77
72. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
73. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting from Calandra, 414
U.S. at 347).
74. See 468 U.S. at 905-06, 921-22 n.22 (1984) (rejecting the idea that the rule is
either a necessary corollary of the fourth amendment or is required by the conjunction of
the fourth and fifth amendments, and stating that the issue of judicial integrity is sub-
sumed in the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose).
75. 428 U.S. at 452 n.22.
76. 468 U.S. at 918-19.
77. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Leon, 468 U.S. at 912; see also
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
421 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I see no insuperable obstacle to the elimination of
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These statements, together with decisions employing a balanc-
ing analysis and refusing to extend the rule to situations in
which its deterrent purpose would be served only marginally or
not at all, make it clear that the important question for the
Court is not whether the rule deters fourth amendment viola-
tions at all, but whether it can reasonably be expected to pro-
vide sufficient deterrence to warrant incurring its substantial so-
cial costs. In this regard, the Court's discussion in Lopez-
Mendoza of the reasons why the exclusionary rule's deterrent
value is significantly reduced in the context of civil deportation
proceedings is particularly instructive. The deterrence-reducing
factors cited by the Court were: the ability to establish grounds
for deportation despite the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evi-
dence; the remote likelihood that any particular arrestee would
challenge the lawfulness of his arrest; the availability of alterna-
tive remedies for INS practices that might violate the fourth
amendment; and-most important-the existence within the
INS itself of a comprehensive scheme for deterring fourth
amendment violations. Each of these factors, but particularly
the last two, would seem to apply with almost equal force to
criminal cases and could, therefore, be used to justify a decision
not to apply the exclusionary rule in other areas of the federal
system beyond the immigration context.
Portentous though Lopez-Mendoza may be in this respect, the
case sounds an even more ominous note for the future of the
exclusionary rule. In the concluding passage of its opinion, the
Court quoted approvingly from Janis:7 8 "There comes a point at
which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law,
cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Ex-
ecutive and Legislative Branches. '7 9 The implications of this
statement are intriguing. To the extent that it suggests that the
federal exclusionary rule of Weeks constitutes a mere exercise of
the Court's supervisory power, it casts serious doubt on the pro-
priety of continuing to apply the rule to the states.8" And, even
if the Court was not signaling an inclination to overrule Mapp,
it did appear once again to be inviting either legislative repeal of
the exclusionary rule or other action by Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch that would obviate the rule.
the suppression doctrine if Congress would provide some meaningful and effective rem-
edy against unlawful conduct by government officials.").
78. 428 U.S. at 459.
79. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
80. See infra Part II.C.
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Although such invitations have not been accepted by the Con-
gress, neither have they gone unheeded. During the 98th Con-
gress, the Senate passed a bill to create a "reasonable, good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions.
Substantially similar legislation is now pending in the Senate
Judiciary Committee, a majority of which previously indicated
its preference for even more substantial limitations on the scope
of the rule."1 The leadership of the House Judiciary Committee
has long opposed any change in the exclusionary rule; conse-
quently, the full House has not had an opportunity to address
the issue, even though there is reason to hope that it might favor
some restriction-if not abolition-of the rule. On the other
hand, both the House and the Senate have given consideration
in recent years to a number of proposals for creating new civil
remedies that, if adopted, might provide a justification for aban-
doning the rule. However, neither body demonstrated an inter-
est in pursuing such proposals during the first session of the
99th Congress.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As suggested above, arguments for and against the exclusion-
ary rule comprehend many issues. However, most of these argu-
ments relate to the two principal justifications now advanced in
support of the rule: the "imperative of judicial integrity" and
the deterrence of police misconduct. Recent Supreme Court
opinions have focused increasingly on the deterrence rationale.
The Leon opinion justified the creation of a "good faith" excep-
tion almost totally with reference to deterrence, which the ma-
jority now clearly sees as the raison d'etre of the exclusionary
rule.82
Although the argument over deterrence now dominates much
of the debate over the exclusionary rule, a consideration of the
"integrity" rationale must still be part of any thorough discus-
sion of the rule. As faith in the deterrence value of the rule has
eroded, defenders of the exclusionary rule have begun to shift
their support of the rule away from the "empirical" question of
deterrence and toward defending it mainly on the basis of
"principle".- 3
81. See S. Rep. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984).
82. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 21, at 581-97.
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This section, in Parts A and B, primarily discusses arguments
for and against the integrity and deterrence rationales advanced
in support of the exclusionary rule, and mentions briefly several
secondary arguments for and against it. Part C examines
whether, in light of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the
idea that the rule is required by the Constitution, there exists
any basis for its application to the states.
A. Arguments For The Exclusionary Rule
1. The Exclusionary Rule Preserves Judicial Integrity
Arguments supporting the exclusionary rule on grounds of
"principle" hold that the exclusion of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment is either a necessary or natural
consequence of the constitutional prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 8' This idea has been expressed in vari-
ous formulations. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
Justice Holmes wrote that "the essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that
it shall not be used at all." 85
In Mapp, the Court quoted Elkins v. United States, to the
effect that protecting the purity of the judicial process was a
paramount justification for the rule: " '[T]here is another con-
sideration-the imperative of judicial integrity.' The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to ob-
serve its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its
own existence." 86
The Leon dissenters observed that "seizures are executed
principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence gener-
ally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial
supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of ille-
gally seized evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns
as the initial seizure of that evidence."8 Proponents of the judi-
cial integrity justification argue that when the state seeks to use
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment it im-
84. Id.
85. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
86. 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting 364 U.S. at 222).
87. 468 U.S. at 933.
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plicitly ratifies or approves the conduct by which the evidence
was procured. A court that accepts such evidence is itself an ac-
cessory to the constitutional violation. Conversely, a court that
excludes the tainted evidence precludes the state, and by impli-
cation the court itself, from "receiving stolen goods" and thereby
becoming a party to the crime."
Although espoused as an argument of "principle" standing
above utilitarian considerations, the "judicial integrity" argu-
ment is in a sense grounded in ultimate cost-benefit considera-
tions. The assumption is that for the constitutional system to
survive the officers of the state must behave ethically. The
,courts help ensure the survival of the system by paying the
'"price" of allowing some criminals to go free. The imposition of
the exclusionary rule has accordingly been justified by the Su-
preme Court, at least with respect to the federal courts, as an
exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the judiciary.
However, whatever the merits of grounding the exclusionary
rule on "principle," the majority of justices have in recent years
clearly rejected that rationale and have evaluated the exclusion-
ary rule in terms of deterrence. 9 Arguments based on "princi-
ple" have appeared almost exclusively in the opinions of the
dissenters.90
2. The Exclusionary Rule Deters Police Misconduct
For many years prior to Mapp there had been a vigorous de-
bate over whether the exclusionary rule did, or could, deter po-
-lice misconduct. The most remarkable aspect of this debate was
the almost complete lack of statistical or empirical support for
either side. Nevertheless, state courts that adopted the rule, and
eventually the Supreme Court, spoke of the deterrent value of
the exclusionary rule as if it were beyond question. 91
88. See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 128 (1942) ("IThis Court has
refused to make itself a participant in lawless conduct by sanctioning the use in open
court of evidence illegally secured.") (Murphy, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Rather than seeking to
give effect to the liberties secured by the fourth amendment through guesswork about
deterrence, the Court should restore to its proper place the principle . .. that an indi-
vidual whose privacy has been invaded ... has a right grounded in that amendment to
prevent the government from subsequently making use of any evidence so obtained.").
91. For a summary of empirical research regarding the exclusionary rule up to the
*mid-1970s, see Comment, Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 373 (1974).
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In recent years, the deterrence debate has grown more sophis-
ticated. There are at least three separate types of deterrence dis-
cussed in the literature. The first type, "special deterrence," re-
fers to the likelihood that a police officer who has had evidence
he seized suppressed will be dissuaded from transgressing fourth
amendment standards again. The second type, called "general
deterrence," refers to the deterrent effect of the rule on law en-
forcement officials who are made more aware of fourth amend-
ment rights and persuaded not to violate them because of the
experiences others have had with exclusion. This kind of deter-
rence concerns the educative effect of the rule. A third type is
usually called "systematic" deterrence. This focuses on the idea
that it is not just the police but the entire justice system that
must be deterred from violating fourth amendment rights. In-
stead of focusing on the police directly, this perspective includes
the belief that the loss of convictions will lead magistrates, pros-
ecutors, and state officials generally to modify police education,
training, and discipline to decrease fourth amendment violations
and thereby increase the quantum of admissible evidence."2 The
particulars of this debate on deterrence are discussed more fully
below in the succeeding section on arguments against the exclu-
sionary rule."3
B. Arguments Against The Exclusionary Rule
There are a number of arguments against the exclusionary
rule. Several go to its effect on the "integrity" of the criminal
justice system. Others question its deterrent value. Finally, there
are arguments concerning its harmful effects, and suggestions
92. As the Leon dissenters argued: "[T]he deterrence rationale for the rule is not
designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of "punishment" of individual
police officers for their failures to obey the restraints imposed by the fourth amendment.
Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional
compliance with fourth amendment requirements on the part of law-enforcement agen-
cies generally." 468 U.S. at 953 (citation and footnote omitted).
93. In addition to the two primary arguments supporting the exclusionary rule, there
are several secondary arguments. It is widely believed that the existence of the exclusion-
ary rule contributes to the development of fourth amendment law by encouraging the
litigation of search and seizure issues. The possibility of evidence suppression, and conse-
quent release of the accused, is thought to encourage defendants to press such claims.
Moreover, it is claimed, under the current regime courts are encouraged to constantly
re-examine the definitions of probable cause, privacy, and the reasonableness of police
conduct. There is also an argument that the exclusionary rule fosters a higher level of
police performance-forcing policemen to abide by fourth amendment standards may
lead to their doing a better and more thorough job of investigation and preparation..
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that there are constitutionally and socially acceptable
alternatives.
1. The Exclusionary Rule Releases Dangerous Criminals,
Encourages Plea Bargains, and Discourages Prosecution
The most obvious objection to the exclusionary rule is that it
prevents the conviction of criminals. At one level there are the
notorious cases in which those guilty of serious crimes are re-
leased because essential evidence is suppressed."4 The overall
impact on convictions is less clear. While it is difficult to quan-
tify the number of convictions lost, several studies suggest the
total is not insignificant.
A 1982 National Institute of Justice study of the effects of the
exclusionary rule in California found a significant impact on the
rate of conviction. According to the study, 4.8% of over 4,000
felony cases rejected for prosecution were declined by prosecu-
tors because of search and seizure problems. The effect of the
exclusionary rule on drug cases was even more pronounced. Ap-
proximately 30% of all felony drug cases were declined by prose-
cutors because of search and seizure problems25
However, the conclusion that the exclusionary rule has a sig-
nificant statistical impact on prosecutions is not universally ac-
cepted. A 1979 General Accounting Office study found a case
declination rate by prosecutors of only 0.4%.96 This study also
found that for cases in which a suppression motion was granted
in whole or in part the conviction rate was approximately 50%.
However, the study found that suppression motions succeeded
in only 1.3% of all prosecuted cases.
There is some consensus that the exclusionary rule "costs" the
state only a small percentage of the total of all possible felony
prosecutions, but this does not answer the question of what con-
stitutes a "significant impact." A small percentage of all such
cases is a very substantial number in absolute terms. Losing that
many convictions certainly poses serious dangers to the commu-
94. Appendix B contains selected examples of such cases.
95. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, The Effects of the Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Study in California (1982). But see Davies, A Hard Look at What We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study and Other Studies of 'Lost' Arrests, Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983) (NIJ study
data interpreted to support the conclusion that prosecutors reject only .8% of all felony
arrests and only 2.4% of all felony drug arrests because of search and seizure difficulties).
96. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Impact of the Ex-
clusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions (1979).
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nity, and there is evidence that the number of lost convictions is
concentrated particularly among certain crimes generally per-
ceived as serious, e.g., weapons and drug offenses. Nor do per-
centages reflect the "cost" of public anger, and the heightened
fear of crime, that may result from the release or truncated pros-
ecution of serious criminals even in a small number of cases.
The loss of evidence at trial is not the only price the state
pays for continuation of the exclusionary rule. The rule may dis-
tort the criminal justice system by tipping the balance in favor
of the accused. Prosecutors who anticipate losing cases at trial
on "technicalities", or who find police conduct in given cases to
fall within a "gray area," may be willing to trade reduced
charges for a guilty plea. Or they may simply choose not to go
forward in cases where there is a significant chance that essen-
tial evidence will be excluded."
2. The Exclusionary Rule Excludes the Most Reliable
Evidence and Undermines the "Truth-seeking" Function of
the Criminal Justice Process
A particular problem with the exclusionary rule is that it often
excludes the most credible evidence of crime, namely physical
evidence within the possession or control of the defendant. In
the words of the current Director of the Department's Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Steven R. Schlesinger, the exclusionary rule is
qualitatively different from other types of exclusion such
as suppression of unreliable confessions, line-up evidence,
or eyewitness identification, for in these areas suppres-
sion takes place because of specific doubts as to the relia-
bility of the evidence. 8
The exclusionary rule thus interferes with the truth-finding
function of the law in a way that other rules governing suppres-
sion, which concern the credibility of evidence, do not.
97. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 56, 80-82 (1968).
98. Schlesinger, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: A
BLUEPRINT 121 (P. McGuigan & R. Rader eds. 1983).
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3. The Exclusionary Rule Diminishes Respect for the Entire
System of Justice
To the extent that the preservation of the integrity of the
courts and the criminal justice system as a whole is a fundamen-
tal purpose of suppression of reliable evidence, the exclusionary
rule may actually work against it. Studies indicate that there is a
widespread public perception that criminals are allowed to get
off through "loopholes" and "technicalities," and that the courts
are to blame. Public respect for the courts and for the criminal
justice system suffers as a result of this departure from the
truth-seeking function. 9
4. The Exclusionary Rule Provides No Remedy for the
Innocent
In one sense, the exclusionary rule vindicates only the rights
of criminals, i.e., persons who otherwise would probably be con-
victed. While the fourth amendment's protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures belong to all, the exclusionary rule
provides relief only to those persons accused of a crime from
whom contraband or other incriminating evidence is obtained.
People whose rights of privacy are violated, but who are not
prosecuted, are afforded no remedy by the exclusionary rule. 0
The exclusionary rule thus operates differently from enforce-
ment mechanisms for other constitutional provisions, such as
the right to jury trial or the assistance of counsel, which are con-
cerned with the truthfinding function of the law and thereby
protect the innocent as well as the guilty.
5. The Exclusionary Rule May Not Significantly Deter
Police Misconduct
At the heart of the current debate over the exclusionary rule
is the issue of whether it does in fact deter police misconduct.
99. The number of respondents in Lou Harris and Associates polls who believed that
courts are "too easy" on criminals jumped from 52% in 1967 to 83% in 1981. See Opin-
ion Roundup, Pub. Opinion, Aug.-Sept. 1982, at 26.
100. See, e.g., Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HAST. L.J.
1065, 1084 (1982).
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The importance of this issue was demonstrated by the majority
opinion in Leon. In Leon, the Supreme Court majority con-
cluded that there should be a "good faith" exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, at least for searches conducted with warrants,
because the rule could not be thought to deter police officers
who violated the fourth amendment, but who acted in the rea-
sonable, good-faith belief that they had complied with the con-
stitutional predicates to a valid search.
One of the most prominent attacks on the deterrent value of
the exclusionary rule has been mounted by Professor Dallin
Oaks. Oaks believes that the rule acts neither as an effective spe-
cial nor general deterrent. I
With respect to special deterrence, Oaks and other commenta-
tors have observed that the exclusionary rule has a negligible de-
terrent effect on the transgressing officer because it does not
punish him directly. Instead, the exclusion of evidence sanction
is imposed most directly upon the prosecutor, who loses the abil-
ity to use the evidence in the case-in-chief against the accused.
Moreover, delays in the criminal justice process and the lack of
communication between prosecutors and arresting officers are
such that policemen often do not know that a "bust" was lost
because of their failure to abide by fourth amendment require-
ments. Many policemen believe that convictions are lost by
prosecutors or judges for reasons unrelated to the exclusionary
rule, and thus have no incentive to modify their behavior. Over-
all, Oaks suggests, the current system may tend to reward and
punish police officers more on the basis of their performance in
areas such as arrest and the seizure of evidence than on whether
the fruits of their labors result in convictions. With respect to
general deterrence, Oaks argues that the value systems of the
police are not receptive to constitutional concerns. Moreover,
the ever-changing rules governing the fourth amendment are
complex, and difficult for police to comprehend and follow. The
fact that such rules may not be communicated clearly to police
compounds the problem.
The question of systematic deterrence was not addressed spe-
cifically by Oaks. However, there does seem to be little question
that many police departments have modified their institutional
practices as a result of Mapp and its progeny. Professional de-
partments now provide training and education to officers to
make them fully aware of warrant requirements and the prereq-
101. See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. Cw. L. REV. 665 (1970).
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uisites for a valid warrantless search.' 02 What is more difficult to
determine is the extent to which such reforms have affected ac-
tual police behavior or the number of fourth amendment
violations.
Ultimately, the deterrent value of the rule is a question for
empirical examination."'3 However, any comparison of deter-
rence is of limited value if it only compares the exclusionary rule
to having no enforcement mechanism, and leaves out the possi-
bility of achieving as much or more deterrence through the
adoption of one of the alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
6. The Exclusionary Rule May Encourage Police and
Judicial Misconduct
Several authorities have speculated that the exclusionary rule
may work to encourage a variety of police and judicial miscon-
duct. Officers who learn that their searches were improper only
after the fact are encouraged to lie about the circumstances
under which the evidence was obtained, even to the point of per-
juring themselves, to save the evidence. °10
Moreover, fear of the exclusionary rule may encourage the po-
lice to employ a variety of tactics designed to combat crime
which may violate the fourth amendment but which are not sub-
ject to the rule. Police may use harassing tactics-such as fre-
quent raids, or repeated arrest and release-which take contra-
'band off the streets and reduce certain criminal activities by
imposing a high "cost" on participation in the criminal activity,
but which stop short of employing the steps of the justice sys-
tem at which the exclusionary rule would be invoked. The net
effect may, therefore, be an increase in fourth amendment viola-
tions as police attempt to work around the rule.105
Related to these problems, as well as to the problem of judi-
cial tinkering with probable cause discussed below, is the prob-
lem of judges "looking the other way" on police and magistrate
misconduct. Because the price of suppressing evidence is so
102. See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusion-
ary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 399-400
(1981).
103. See supra Part II.A.2.
104. See Oaks, supra note 101, at 739-40.
105. See Goodpaster, supra note 100, at 1090-91; Oaks, supra note 101, at 720-24
(much police enforcement activity is not subject to the rule); see also Wilkey, Why Sup-
press Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDcATuRE 215, 355-56 (1978).
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high, some judges may be willing to accept outrageous police sto-
ries of how evidence was obtained, or ignore complaints about
warrant defects or the conduct of investigations, to keep evi-
dence in. If the courts were able to review and sanction police
conduct, and assess the adequacy of warrants, in a forum dis-
tinct from the prosecution of the accused, they would probably
be far more exacting in their review.'"
7. The Exclusionary Rule May Undercut the Fourth
Amendment by Encouraging Judges to Lower the Threshold
of Probable Cause
A number of commentators have argued that the exclusionary
rule encourages judges to lower the threshold of probable cause.
Because judges are sensitive to the problem of allowing criminals
to go free, they have an incentive to find that the basis for police
action was sufficient. The quantum of evidence necessary to con-
stitute probable cause falls ever lower as precedents accumulate.
More searches may be conducted without a warrant, and the re-
quirements for getting a warrant become less stringent. If there
were an alternative to the exclusionary rule that penalized police
misconduct, but that did not require evidence suppression,
judges might be more willing to hold police to a higher standard
of probable cause, and the interests of the fourth amendment
might thereby be better served.
107
8. The Continuation of the Exclusionary Rule Discourages
the Search for Alternatives
The existence of the exclusionary rule may discourage the de-
velopment of superior alternatives. Although the Chief Justice
and others have invited Congress and the states to develop other
approaches, and have indicated that the Supreme Court might
give up the exclusionary rule once effective alternatives were in
place, the incentive for finding such replacements may be inhib-
ited by the existence of the rule, as it gives the impression that
the Supreme Court has preempted the field."'8
106. See Goodpaster, supra note 100, at 1090-91.
107. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 98, at 122-23.
108. See, e.g., Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to
the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385 (1981).
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9. The Exclusionary Rule Distorts the Allocation of Judicial
and Criminal Justice Resources
The cost in time and resources expended in considering and
disposing of suppression motions may be considerable. One
study found thirty-four percent of all court time in one Chicago
narcotics court to be spent on hearing motions to suppress. 09 In
addition to the time of trial courts, there is the time spent by
prosecutors screening cases for exclusionary rule problems and
defending against suppression motions, and the time spent by
appellate courts in reviewing suppression decisions on direct re-
view and on collateral attack. Given the reality of necessarily
limited judicial and criminal justice resources, the justice system
might be better served-and fourth amendment rights better
protected-by an alternative that examines and sanctions search
and seizure violations outside the prosecutorial process.
C. To The Extent The Exclusionary Rule Is Not
Constitutionally Required, There Is No Principled Basis For
Its Application To The States
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's justification of the
exclusionary rule has narrowed considerably. In Mapp, the
Court described the rule as "constitutionally necessary." 10 But
other Supreme Court opinions have generally not held that ex-
clusion is a constitutional command of the fourth amendment
itself."' Indeed, in United States v. Calandra, Justice Powell
wrote for the Court that "the [exclusionary] rule is a judicially-
created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved. ' '" 2 This characteriza-
tion was adopted and amplified by the majority in Leon, which
expressly rejected "[1]anguage in opinions of this Court and of
individual Justices [that] has sometimes implied that the exclu-
sionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amend-
109. See Oaks, supra note 101, at 744-45. Additionally, based upon the GAO finding
that suppression motions succeed in only 1.3% of prosecuted cases, there are 77 unmer-
itorious suppression motions for every meritorious motion, indicating a significant con-
sumption of judicial resources. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
110. 367 U.S. 643, 656.
111. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the majority rejected the idea that the
exclusionary rule was an inherent part of the fourth amendment. Id. at 37-48.
112. 414 U.S. at 347-48.
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ment."113 The Court similarly rejected the Mapp rationales that
the rule was compelled "by the conjunction of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments,1 1 4 or by the fifth amendment."'5 Moreover,
in Lopez-Mendoza, the Court, in an opinion verging on an en-
dorsement of an ad hoc approach to applying the exclusionary
rule based on a balancing of deterrence versus "costs," quoted
United States v. Janis e in dicta as follows:
There comes a point at which courts, consistent with
their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to cre-
ate barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a super-
visory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and
Legislative Branches.
This re-characterization of the basis of the exclusionary rule is
fraught with doctrinal implications which have not yet been
fully explored by the Court. Among these is the question of how
the Supreme Court can possibly justify continued application of
the rule against the states.
Now that the Court has indicated in Janis and Leon that the
rule is an exercise of "supervisory power," it is not clear what
basis exists for the judicial application of the rule to the state
courts. The Supreme Court has never overtly asserted or de-
fended the proposition that it possesses the authority to exclude
evidence in a case in which the state court itself would not vio-
late the Constitution by admitting it, and it is difficult to see
what constitutional authority the Court could point to as the ba-
sis for the assumption of such power.
There is another, fundamental issue, not addressed here, con-
cerning what power the federal courts have to prescribe such
"prophylactic" rules for any level of government. The Supreme
Court has claimed a supervisory power to prescribe non-consti-
tutional rules of evidence for Article III courts, but both the
source and the scope of this power are unclear.'
113. 468 U.S. at 905-06. To be sure, dissenting justices continue to espouse the Mapp
view that exclusion is required by the Constitution. For example, Justice Brennan, dis-
senting in Leon, argued that "The Amendment therefore must be read to condemn not
only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is done, after all, for the
purpose of securing evidence-but also the subsequent use of any evidence so obtained."
468 U.S. at 934.
114. Id. at 905-06.
115. Id.
116. 428 U.S. at 459 (emphasis supplied).
117. See infra note 213.
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In any event, because the Court considers the propriety of ap-
plying the exclusionary rule "in a particular case" to be "an is-
sue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct," '118 two consequences seem to follow as a matter
of logic: first, the current broad application of the rule is objec-
tionable as an unprincipled interference with state courts by the
federal judiciary; second, the rule should at a minimum be re-
turned to its status prior to Mapp, i.e., as a limitation on federal
but not state action.
III. OTHER METHODS OF PREVENTING AND REDRESSING FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
As noted above, although deterrence of unreasonable searches
and seizures is now widely accepted as the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule, the suppression of unlawfully seized evi-
dence has remedial consequences as well-at least for those
guilty persons who would otherwise be convicted on the basis of
such evidence. However, the exclusionary rule is not the only de-
vice available in the federal system for deterring fourth amend-
ment violations or redressing their consequences, and-in light
of the substantial costs and dubious benefits of the suppression
doctrine-other alternatives deserve careful attention.
This section begins by describing approaches that other civi-
lized nations have taken to the problem of unlawful searches.
The discussion then turns to various alternatives that currently
exist, or that might be adopted, in this country to prevent or
redress fourth amendment violations. These include the use of
criminal prosecutions, equitable remedies, administrative prac-
tices, and civil damage suits, as well as reliance on a less expan-
sive version of the exclusionary rule.
A. Foreign Responses And Approaches To Improperly
Seized Evidence
While improper police conduct in obtaining evidence is not a
problem unique to America, the systematic exclusion of evidence
so obtained from the trial of the accused is. Other nations, in-
cluding those with a common law legal tradition, have not
118. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
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adopted a response similar to the American exclusionary rule.
The three systems described below-those of England, Canada,
and West Germany-exemplify differing foreign approaches to
the problem.
1. England
The English legal system is in many respects very similar to
our own, but England takes a radically different approach to the
question of how to treat illegally seized evidence. Put simply,
the general rule is inclusion. As stated in a leading English case,
"It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be
admissible in evidence." ''
English law distinguishes coerced confessions from physical
evidence. Involuntary confessions are more readily subject to
suppression because of their inherent unreliability. Physical evi-
dence is presumptively admissible, and there is no exclusionary
principle akin to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine enun-
ciated in this country in Silverthorne.
Apart from involuntary confessions there are two general situ-
ations where an English judge has the discretion to suppress: (1)
cases where the judge finds that inclusion would work a "hard-
ship on the accused" relative to the gravity of the crime (for ex-
ample, where the police obtain evidence through false represen-
tations, threats, or tricks); and (2) cases where evidence was
obtained in violation of prescribed procedures for obtaining con-
victions for a specific statutory offense.
Overall, it appears that English judges rarely use their discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence. Conviction as a result of the
prosecution's use of illegal evidence is not in itself deemed to be
"unfair."
Deterrence in the English system is accomplished by several
means. At one level, common-law remedies are available to the
victim of an illegal search. An officer exceeding the terms of a
warrant may be held liable as a trespasser in a civil suit. The
primary deterrent mechanism, however, appears to be internal
police force disciplinary procedures, which may include "fines,
pay cuts, undesirable transfers, and removal from the force."120
119. R. v. Leatham, 8 Cox C.C. 498 (Crompton, J.) (1861).
120. See Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alterna-
tives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648, 659-63 (1983).
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2. Canada
Until recently Canada had a statutory, as opposed to a consti-
tutional, bill of rights. The traditional Canadian system closely
paralleled the English approach to the problem of illegally
seized evidence. The preferred remedies in Canada included civil
tort actions for damages and administrative discipline. Professor
Oaks, who studied the Canadian experience, concluded that the
tort action was a reasonably effective option for victims of an
illegal search within the Canadian system. Canadian juries ap-
peared sensitive to illegal police practices and were apt to give
awards proportionate to the violations committed. An officer de-
fending such an action was entitled to raise the defense that his
conduct was justified either by a common-law rule or by statu-
tory authorization. The Canadian Criminal Code protects an of-
ficer "if he acts on reasonable and probable cause grounds, is
justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and is
using as much force as is necessary for that purpose." This pro-
vision has been applied to shield officers from civil as well as
criminal liability." 1
This approach changed when Canada adopted the "Constitu-
tion Act of 1981." This document sets forth in part I the "Cana-
.dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." This charter is modelled
in many respects on the American Bill of Rights. In section 8,
the charter echoes the fourth amendment in its statement that
"Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure." Section 24 of the Charter provides for judicial
review of violations of the Charter and further provides "that
evidence [that] was obtained in any manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this charter . . .
shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute."' 22
Remedies under the Charter are supplemental to pre-existing
remedies. For example, the fact that a Canadian court may sup-
press evidence does not preclude the bringing of a tort action. As
of this date the Canadian Supreme Court has decided only one
121. See Oaks, supra note 101, at 702-05. However, Oaks' view is not universally
shared. At least some Canadian legal scholars contend that the traditional remedies of
civil actions and internal discipline did not constitute an effective deterrent to police
misconduct, and that the inclusion of an exclusionary rule in the new Charter reflects
this. See infra note 122.
"122. Whittington, THz CANADIAN PoLITIcAL SvsM ENVIRONMENT STRucruRE AND
PRoc ss app. II (3d ed. 1981).
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exclusion case. Canadian exclusionary rule law remains very
much in its formative stage. Lower court decisions indicate that
the Canadian courts will weigh a variety of factors, including the
good faith of the officer and seriousness of the crime, in making
their decisions.
123
3. Federal Republic of Germany
In West Germany exclusion of evidence is rare. Generally, the
German system has few fixed rules governing the admissibility
of evidence, and evidence is suppressed only when deviation
from prescribed standards is thought to jeopardize its reliability.
The judge is given broad discretion to balance the importance of
the evidence against the importance of protecting personal pri-
vacy against unwarranted intrusion. German authorities en-
courage citizen complaints about police misconduct. Police de-
partments review allegations of misconduct administratively,
and such administrative review is subject to governmental and
judicial oversight. Officers may be fined, lose promotions, or
even be imprisoned for misconduct. Civil actions by private citi-
zens also provide a remedy.
124
This "totality of the circumstances" approach, under which
courts weigh such factors as the seriousness of police miscon-
duct, the type of evidence seized, the degree of probable cause,
and related factors, in deciding whether to suppress, is common
to other European countries as well.1
2 5
B. Criminal Prosecutions
In this country, under certain circumstances, a law enforce-
ment officer who conducts an unlawful search and seizure may
be prosecuted for a criminal offense under federal or state law.
Federal statutes that provide a basis for such a prosecution in-
clude the following provisions of Title XVIII: § 241 (conspiracy
to violate constitutional rights), § 242 (deprivation of rights
under color of law), § 2234 (exceeding authority in executing a
123. Information on recent Canadian experience was provided to the Office of Legal
Policy by Professor William Van Veen of the University of Windsor in a telephone con-
ference on January 17, 1986.
124. See Comment, supra note 120, at 666-69.
125. See Rader, supra note 17, at 1471; Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983).
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search warrant), § 2235 (procuring a search warrant maliciously
and without probable cause), and § 2236 (conducting a warrant-
less search not incident to arrest or without consent). Because
all but the first of these offenses are misdemeanors, prosecutions
can be undertaken without the concurrence of a grand jury. In
addition, because a federal court may order restitution as part of
the sentence for any federal offense,"' criminal prosecutions for
fourth amendment violations can have remedial as well as deter-
rent consequences.
For several reasons, however, criminal prosecution seems ill-
suited as a routine sanction for fourth amendment violations.
The effectiveness of criminal prosecution as a deterrent to
fourth amendment violations depends, initially, on the willing-
ness of prosecutors to lodge criminal charges against law en-
forcement officers. It is sometimes argued that it is unrealistic to
rely on criminal prosecutions because prosecutors may be reluc-
tant to charge fellow members of the law enforcement commu-
nity, with whom they feel it necessary to maintain close working
relationships.
1 7
While this reluctance may be a factor in some situations, a
more likely explanation for the dearth of criminal cases against
law enforcement officers lies in the nature of most fourth
amendment violations and the requirements of the criminal pro-
cess. The great majority of unlawful searches and seizures-at
least in the federal system-appear to involve mistakes of law or
fact, rather than willful or malicious conduct, on the part of law
enforcement officers. Thus, where the officers did not believe
their conduct to be unlawful, prosecutors no doubt frequently
conclude that prosecution would be inappropriate, given the re-
quirement of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable
doubt."2 8
In short, criminal sanctions are not appropriate except in
cases of particularly serious fourth amendment violations-those
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663.
127. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 108, at 1397.
128. Of course, not all fourth amendment violations are inadvertent. Even in the fed-
eral system, there occur from time to time deliberate and serious departures from ac-
cepted search and seizure norms. The United States has sought criminal penalties in the
past. See, e.g., United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1979), in which two senior
FBI officials were convicted of conspiring to violate fourth amendment rights by con-
ducting surreptitious entries into homes and other premises during a fugitive investiga-
tion. (The defendants were subsequently granted a presidential pardon.) However, con-
victions may still be difficult to come by, and, in any event, because they are so rarely
warranted, criminal prosecutions occur too sporadically to be relied on as a sole
deterrent.
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in which law enforcement officers can be shown to have acted
with criminal intent. Because such cases are extremely rare, and
because the requirements of the criminal process are difficult to
satisfy, a deterrent strategy cannot be based on the threat of
criminal prosecution alone.
C. Administrative Practices
1. Existing Federal Practices
Federal law enforcement agencies have developed a variety of
administrative mechanisms for preventing and punishing fourth
amendment violations, as well as other unlawful or improper
conduct on the part of agency personnel. These devices include:
(1) comprehensive legal training, including initial and follow-up
training in the law of search and seizure; (2) specific rules and
regulations governing the conduct of employees, and the use of
investigative techniques such as searches and seizures; (3) insti-
tutional arrangements for conducting internal investigations of
alleged violations of the rules and regulations; and (4) discipli-
nary measures that may be imposed for unlawful or improper
conduct. 29 In addition, former Attorney General Civiletti di-
rected, as a matter of Departmental policy, that any evidence
seized through intentionally unlawful conduct be excluded from
the proceeding for which it was obtained.130
Among the various administrative steps taken by the federal
government to prevent unlawful searches and seizures, the
-threat of disciplinary action deserves particular attention. A fed-
eral law enforcement officer who violates the fourth amend-
ment-unless he acted in good faith-faces not only the pros-
pect of criminal prosecution and a suit for damages by the
aggrieved party, but also the threat of adverse administrative ac-
tion by his superiors. For example, law enforcement officers in
all components of the Department of Justice other than the FBI
are subject to the disciplinary provisions of Department of Jus-
129. The point is illustrated, for example, by requirements and practices of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, which are referred to in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1044-45, and discussed more fully in the Brief for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in that case (No. 83-491) at 39-44. The rules and regulations of
the Internal Revenue Service relating to electronic surveillance are discussed in United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
130. See Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bu-
reaus and Divisions, Violations of Search and Seizure Law (Jan. 16, 1981).
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tice Order 1752.1A, dated April 27, 1981.131 That order de-
scribes, and specifies the range of permissible disciplinary mea-
sures for, a number of "offenses" that may result in disciplinary
action. Included are "offenses" involving intentional, reckless,
and negligent violation of rules governing searches and seizures.
Permissible disciplinary action depends on the nature of the vio-
lation and whether it is a first or subsequent transgression, and
ranges from an official reprimand, to suspension for up to fifteen
days, to removal from office.
Investigations of allegedly unlawful searches and seizures are
conducted by the Department's Office of Professional Responsi-
bility, as well as by similar internal inspection offices within the
various components. The Office's records indicate that since Or-
der 1752.1A went into effect, seven cases involving allegations of
misconduct in connection with searches and seizures have been
brought to its attention. In two of these cases, both involving the
DEA, the allegations were determined by the courts in rulings
on suppression motions to be unfounded. In four others, internal
FBI investigations established that no misconduct had occurred
and, after review, the Office concurred in those determinations.
In the remaining case, the allegations were also found to be un-
substantiated, but the Office's records do not indicate by whom
this finding was made. In short, since 1981 there has been no
occasion to punish employees for violating the Department's
search and seizure rules. 
1 2
2. Proposed Review Boards
A number of commentators have suggested establishing extra-
judicial disciplinary procedures for dealing with fourth amend-
ment violations by law enforcement officers. 133 To overcome the
131. The FBI, which has traditionally been permitted to promulgate and enforce its
own rules of conduct for its employees, has a comparable set of disciplinary rules and
regulations. Under the FBI's Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties, punish-
ment for unlawful searches that are conducted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally
may extend to removal in appropriate cases, even for the first offense. An FBI and grand
jury investigation of the fourth amendment violations that led to the Felt prosecution,
referred to in note 128 supra, resulted in the resignations of several FBI agents, as well
as the dismissal of the agent in charge of the FBI's New York field office for testifying
'falsely before the grand jury.
132. However, 20 INS officers have been suspended or terminated for unspecified
misconduct involving aliens. Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Lo-
pez-Mendoza (No. 83-491).
133. See, e.g., Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1971).
Search and Seizure
Journal of Law Reform
reluctance of prosecutors to pursue sanctions against officers
with whom they need to maintain a good working relationship,
and because police supervisors may lack sufficient incentive to
punish officers, these proposals usually suggest that discipline be
meted out by an independent review board of some kind.
A detailed proposal of this type has been advocated by Profes-
sor Schlesinger as part of an overall plan he has outlined as an
alternative to the exclusionary rule.' Under Schlesinger's pro-
posal, an independent board comprised of private citizens and
public officials would handle accusations of police misconduct in
cases referred by a trial judge when the judge believes there to
have been illegal police behavior. A hearing would be held before
the board, at which the accused officer or officers would be rep-
resented by counsel, and the victim of the alleged violation
would be represented by a special counsel operating indepen-
dently of the prosecutor's office. The board would take into ac-
count the nature and severity of the constitutional transgression,
as well as any affirmative defenses raised by the officer, includ-
ing the claim that he acted in good faith. The board would then
decide what punishment or discipline, if any, was appropriate.
In serious cases it might refer the case to the prosecutor for the
initiation of criminal prosecution.
D. Injunctions And Mandamus
It might be possible in some instances to employ court injunc-
tions to stop systematic abuses of fourth amendment rights by
individual police departments. Federal courts have used their
equitable powers to force police compliance with both the civil
rights laws and the fourteenth amendment. '
The Supreme Court has cited the possibility of obtaining ef-
fective declaratory relief against an identifiable pattern of fourth
amendment violations to justify not applying the exclusionary
rule. In Lopez-Mendoza, it noted that because the INS is a cen-
tralized agency "engaged in operations of broad scope but highly
repetitive character . . . [t]he possibility of declaratory relief
against the agency. . . offers a means for challenging the valid-
ity of INS practices." For this and other reasons, the Court con-
134. See Schlesinger, supra note 98, at 123-32.
135. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 346 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (injunction against
Baltimore Police Department upon showing that over 300 homes had been searched for
fugitives on the basis of anonymous tips).
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cluded that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in de-
portation proceedings was "undermined."'
Nonetheless, there remain obstacles to the use of declaratory
relief as an effective alternative to the exclusionary rule for
fourth amendment violations. Under Rizzo v. Goode18 7 a party
seeking relief must shoulder the heavy burden of demonstrating
that systematic violations are the result of a policy of the de-
fendant agency. Moreover, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,'"
the Supreme Court highlighted the formidable standing problem
involved: a party injured in the past cannot obtain an injunction
unless he can demonstrate that he is likely to be a victim of the
offending practice sometime in the future.189 Finally, since con-
tempt sanctions are usually imposed only for knowing or willful
violations, this remedy comes with a built-in good faith defense
for the police. "1 0
E. Civil Damage Suits
1. Bivens Actions
From the adoption of the fourth amendment in 1791 until the
Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,"" a person whose
fourth amendment rights had been violated by a federal law en-
forcement officer could not recover compensation in federal
court from either the officer or the government. The absence of
an act of Congress providing a cause of action was thought to
shield the officer from personal liability,14 2 and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was an insurmountable barrier to recovery
against the United States. 43 Thus, prior to the adoption of the
exclusionary rule, the sole remedy for an unlawful search and
136. 468 U.S. at 1045.
137. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
138. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
139. See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop-
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1365, 1387 (1983).
140. See Schroeder, supra note 108, at 1407-1410; see also KAMISAR, LAFAvE, &
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 238-39 (5th ed. 1980).
141. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
142. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
143. Until 1974, the waiver of sovereign immunity reflected in the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not extend to intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement
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seizure by federal officers was an action under state law for tres-
pass or, in some instances, for assault, battery, false arrest, or
false imprisonment as well. The exclusionary rule provided an-
other avenue of redress, but only to persons prosecuted on the
basis of unlawfully obtained evidence; and, even for those per-
sons, the remedy was limited to suppression of the evidence.
In Bivens, however, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts could entertain suits for damages brought by victims of
illegal searches against the responsible federal officers, notwith-
standing the absence of a congressional enactment creating such
a cause of action. Such a remedy, the Court reasoned, could be
implied from the fourth amendment's guarantee against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, absent an "explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of
the fourth amendment may not recover money damages from
the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress.' 14 4 Subsequently, the
Court emphasized that Bivens is intended to serve a deterrent as
well as a compensatory purpose. 145
In theory, a Bivens action has three advantages over the ex-
clusionary rule as a deterrent and remedial device. First, it offers
redress to persons whose fourth amendment rights are violated
but who are not prosecuted. Second, it has an element of pro-
portionality, because the amount of a judgment may be varied to
reflect the seriousness of the constitutional violation. Third, by
threatening the individual officer with personal liability, it pro-
duces a measure of "specific deterrence." At a practical level,
however, Bivens actions are subject to several criticisms from
the standpoint of plaintiffs, defendants, and society.
It has been estimated that, since 1971, some 12,000 Bivens
suits have been filed against individual federal employees. Be-
cause the courts have extended the Bivens rationale to permit
suits based on constitutional violations other than unlawful
searches,'' and because the Department's records of Bivens ac-
tions are not maintained in a manner that permits ready identi-
fication of the particular constitutional violations alleged, it is
not known how many of these suits arose out of allegedly unlaw-
ful searches and seizures. What is known, however, is that in
officers in the performance of their duties. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2790-91.
144. 403 U.S. at 397.
145. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).
146. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment violation);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment violation).
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very few of these cases-less than thirty-two by the end of
1985-were verdicts rendered against federal officers, and in
fewer still were those judgments sustained on post-trial motion
or on appeal. In fact, there have been only five cases in which
the individual defendants have had to pay damages."
4
7
The lack of success experienced by plaintiffs in constitutional
tort suits may result in part from a paucity of valid claims
against federal officers. In actions based on the fourth amend-
ment, juries may also tend to sympathize with, and credit the
testimony of, the defendant law enforcement officers rather than
the plaintiffs, especially if the latter have been charged with or
convicted of crimes. The qualified immunity that shields federal
officials from suits based on conduct that was objectively reason-
able further reduces the likelihood of recovery."' 8 There are
other factors as well-principally the difficulty of proving dam-
ages if no physical injury was inflicted on the plaintiff or if his
property was not damaged, and the difficulty of collecting any
award because the defendant may be "judgment proof."
Bivens suits also have problematic features from the point of
view of law enforcement officers and society. Although the of-
ficers can be reasonably confident that they will ultimately be
exonerated, during the pendency of the suit their credit is im-
paired and they are subjected to the emotional pain and humili-
ation of being publicly charged with violating the very rights it
is their duty to protect. Moreover, the ever-present threat of
personal financial liability for well-meaning action taken in the
ordinary course of their duties may dissuade some officers from
enforcing the law as vigorously as society would wish. " ' As the
Supreme Court has recently recognized, "there is the danger
that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.' ,1o In short, Bivens ac-
tions have a substantial capacity for deterring desirable as well
as undesirable law enforcement behavior.
147. This data was furnished to the Office of Legal Policy informally by the Torts
Branch of the Civil Division on January 7, 1986.
148. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
149. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (potential liability will deter
police from decisively and willingly executing their duties).
150. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (brackets in original) (quoting
from Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950)).
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2. Federal Tort Claims Act Suits
In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, to permit suits against the fed-
eral government based on certain kinds of tortious con-
duct-assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution-by investigative or law en-
forcement officers of the United States. As a result, a person
whose fourth amendment rights have been violated by an unlaw-
ful search now has the option of seeking damages from the
United States.151
The principal advantage of this option, of course, is the ability
of the government to pay any judgment that may be entered
against it. It may also be advantageous for a plaintiff to have his
claim heard by a judge rather than a jury."2 In other respects,
however, an FTCA suit is no more attractive-and possibly less
so-than a Bivens action from the standpoint of potential plain-
tiffs. Unlike a Bivens suit, an FTCA action does not allow an
award of punitive damages. 5 Furthermore, in a suit under the
FTCA, the United States can avail itself of the same defenses
that would be available to its officers if they were sued individu-
ally under a Bivens theory.'" Thus, a person seeking to recover
damages for an unlawful search must show that the govern-
ment's agents acted unreasonably, whether or not he sues the
responsible individuals. The legislative history of the 1974
amendment indicates that the new cause of action against the
United States was intended to supplement rather than supplant
the Bivens remedy against individual law enforcement officers.' 5'
This intention has been given effect by the Supreme Court,
which has concluded that-in light of the differences in the two
actions and in the absence of special factors-a person wronged
by an unlawful search may pursue either remedy." 6 However, a
judgment against the United States in an FTCA suit bars the
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2791.
152. As noted above in the discussion of Bivens suits, jurors may be inclined to credit
the testimony of law enforcement officers more than that of certain types of plaintiffs.
Trial by jury is not permitted, however, under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (punitive dam-
ages permitted in Bivens suit).
154. See Norton v. Turner, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003
(1978) (in suit under FTCA, United States is entitled to raise all defenses available to its
agents, including good faith and reasonable belief).
155. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2791 (1974 FTCA amendments were
intended as "a counterpart" to Bivens by making the government independently liable).
156. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 18-23.
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plaintiff from proceeding against the responsible government
employees."'
Despite the availability of the FTCA, very few suits have been
brought under the 1974 amendment, 5" as compared with the
thousands of Bivens actions that have been filed since 1971. Two
explanations can be suggested for this imbalance, both of which
relate to the psychology of persons who believe or claim that
their fourth amendment rights have been violated. First, since
an unlawful search may result in only nominal damages, plain-
tiffs may be more attracted by the prospect of recovering a judg-
ment for punitive damages in a Bivens suit, even if the judgment
may not be enforceable, than by the lure of recovering actual
damages in an FTCA action. Second, in these cases the plain-
tiff's primary motivation may not be to obtain monetary redress,
but to retaliate against the individuals responsible for the al-
leged wrong. For this purpose, a suit against an impersonal en-
tity is far less satisfactory than an action against individuals who
can be made to suffer whether or not they are ultimately found
liable and actually respond in damages."8 9
Whatever its causes, the apparent preference for Bivens ac-
tions on the part of persons allegedly subjected to fourth amend-
ment violations has perpetuated many of the problems existing
before Congress amended the FTCA. Federal law enforcement
officers are still subject to harassing lawsuits that threaten them
with personal liability for their official conduct, and society con-
tinues to risk an unacceptable reduction in the willingness of
these officers to discharge their duties vigorously and fearlessly.
3. Suits under 18 U.S.C. § 2520
In addition to Bivens and FTCA suits, which can be brought
by anyone whose fourth amendment rights have been violated,
federal law provides a special civil cause of action to persons
whose wire or oral communications have been unlawfully inter-
cepted, disclosed, or used. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, such persons
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
158. The Civil Division's Torts Branch reported to the 'Office of Legal Policy infor-
mally on January 7, 1986 that, although no satistics are available, the number of suits
based on amended section 2680(h) has been "de minimis."
159. A third explanation could be that there is no imbalance. As noted above, it is
not known how many of the Bivens suits were based on fourth amendment claims. If this
figure could be determined, it might be found to approximate the number of FTCA suits
brought against federal law enforcement officers.
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may sue the individuals responsible-but not the govern-
ment-and may recover compensatory damages of not less than
the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, as
well as punitive damages and the costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorneys' fees. The statute specifically provides that
good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization
constitutes a complete defense to such an action.
This specialized statute permits generous recoveries and,
hence, provides ample incentive to sue. Nevertheless, the anno-
tations to the statute indicate that very few such actions have
been brought. The paucity of such suits is no doubt explained
largely by the fact that-due to the care with which federal law
enforcement officers engage in electronic surveillance-this type
of fourth amendment violation is extremely rare. Additional ex-
planations may be that, when violations do occur, the availabil-
ity of the statutory defense, or the perceived inability of poten-
tial defendants to satisfy a judgment, render a lawsuit
futile-although the same considerations do not appear to deter
plaintiffs from bringing Bivens suits.
4. Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A counterpart to the damage remedies available to persons
whose fourth amendment rights have been violated by federal
agents is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute holds out
the prospect of civil redress to persons subjected to unlawful
searches and seizures by state or local law enforcement officers
acting under color of state law. A suit under section 1983 may be
brought either against the individual officers involved,10 or
against the municipality or local government that employs
them. 6' Moreover, if the suit is successful, the plaintiff is enti-
tled to an award of attorneys' fees.
1 62
However, suits based on unlawful searches and seizures ap-
pear to be a relatively limited category of section 1983 litigation.
The annotations to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 reflect fewer than
three dozen reported fourth amendment cases over the past 20
years.
Factors that may discourage such suits have already been
noted in the discussion of Bivens actions. For example, in a suit
160. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
161. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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against the individual police officers under section 1983-as in a
Bivens action-the plaintiff must overcome the defense of "good
faith" available to the officers.1" Moreover, even if the plaintiff
surmounts this hurdle, the monetary award he receives may be
unenforceable because the defendant officers lack the resources
to satisfy a judgment for substantial damages.
The prospects of obtaining satisfaction of a judgment are con-
siderably greater in a suit against the municipality whose officers
conducted an unlawful search. The chances of prevailing at trial
may be better, as well, because the municipal defendant-unlike
the federal government in a FTCA suit-cannot rely on the good
faith immunity of its individual police officers'" in defending
against a suit."" Nevertheless, the plaintiff cannot prevail sim-
ply on a respondeat superior theory. Instead, he must show that
the unconstitutional action implemented or executed an official
policy of the local government.'" This requirement may inhibit
some section 1983 suits based on fourth amendment violations,
since most unlawful searches are the result of wrongful actions
by individual law enforcement officers, rather than the conse-
quences of official policy decisions to violate the fourth amend-
ment. However, even a policy that is not itself unconstitu-
tional-such as a policy of providing inadequate training-may
satisfy the Monell requirement if it is shown to be causally re-
lated to the constitutional deprivation and the product of a con-
scious choice by the policymaker.1 7 . While no doubt difficult to
make, such a showing is not impossible.' "
F. A Limited Or Modified Exclusionary Rule
In addition to the proposals that have been made to abolish
the exclusionary rule outright and substitute some different spe-
cies of remedy or deterrent, there are a number of proposals to
modify or curtail the exclusionary rule while retaining it in some
instances. Some of these proposals remain theoretical, while
163. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
164. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
165. Since the good faith of the officers is not in issue, an inclination of jurors to
resolve testimonial conflicts in favor of the officers may not be as important a factor in
suits against municipalities as it might be in suits against individual officers.
166. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
167. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
168. Cf. Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
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others have been incorporated in proposed legislation or model
codes. "6
1. Expanding the "Good Faith" Exception to Warrantless
Searches and Seizures
In Leon, the Supreme Court created an exception to the ex-
clusionary rule for cases in which an officer acts in objectively
reasonable reliance on a warrant obtained from a magistrate.
This so-called "good faith" exception was grounded in the ma-
jority's conclusion that the rule generally has minimal or no legi-
mate deterrent effect in cases where officers attempt to comply
with fourth amendment requirements by obtaining a warrant,
but the warrant subsequently proves defective. 7 '
The Administration has supported a "good faith" exception
for both warrant and warrantless searches.' 7 ' Legislation includ-
ing a generalized "good faith" exception has been introduced at
the federal level and passed by the Senate.
17 2
Application of the "good faith" exception to warrantless
searches and seizures is a natural and reasonable extension of
the principle embodied in Leon. If the exclusionary rule has no
legitimate deterrent effect in relation to an officer acting in
"good faith" with a warrant, it would seem that the same is true
in relation to an officer acting in "good faith" in a non-warrant
case. Certainly, some of the language justifying the "good faith"
exception in Leon appears applicable to both types of
searches.173 On the other hand, Leon's holding did not extend to
searches in warrantless cases. First, the Court observed approv-
ingly that the probable cause determination in a warrant case
would be in the hands of a "neutral and detached magistrate,"
not in the hands of the police. Second, the presence of a warrant
169. See generally S. Rep. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1984)
170. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
171. President Reagan has personally endorsed legislation to expand the good faith
exception. See 128 Cong. Rec. S11228 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1982); see also ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981) ("[Elvidence should not
be excluded from a criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer acting in the
reasonable good-faith belief that it was in conformity to the fourth amendment.").
172. The general "good faith" legislation was passed by the Senate in 1984 as S. 1764.
See generally S. Rep. No. 350, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
173. E.g., "[E]ven assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct
and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in
accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 918-19 (1984).
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also provides a relatively easy means for a reviewing court to
examine the "good faith" question, because a "'warrant issued
by a magistrate normally suffices to establish' that a law enforce-
ment officer has 'acted in good faith in conducting the
search.' "1
The extension of the exception, accordingly, would require the
courts to embark on the more difficult task of ascertaining
whether a warrantless search was conducted in "good faith."
The extension of the exception has been attacked on this and
other grounds by commentators, several of whom believe that
such an extension would undercut the incentives Leon estab-
lished for getting a warrant whenever possible. 175 Nonetheless,
even under Leon courts must examine the question whether an
officer's reliance on a warrant is "objectively reasonable." It
would, therefore, appear to be a difference of degree rather than
kind for a court to determine whether an officer acted in objec-
tive good faith in conducting a warrantless search. The courts
must in any event develop criteria for such review in applying
the "good faith" defense in Bivens suits and section 1983 suits
based on warrantless searches.
17 6
2. Limiting the Exclusionary Rule to Exempt Certain
Serious Crimes
The Chief Justice, among others, has criticized the exclusion-
ary rule as a "monolithic" response to fourth amendment viola-
tions of varying degrees. Indeed, much of the opposition to the
rule is attributable to the relatively small number of cases where
a murderer, rapist, or arsonist is set free because of the opera-
tion of the rule, rather than those where a pickpocket or petty
drug user is turned loose.
Accordingly, to the extent the exclusionary rule does serve
some worthwhile purpose, the bulk of its deterrent value might
be preserved by keeping the rule for most crimes, but not sup-
pressing evidence needed to convict for the most serious of-
fenses. At least one commentator has suggested that "the rule
not apply in the most serious cases-treason, espionage, murder,
174. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32
(1982)).
175. See, e.g., LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon,
Its Rationale and Ramifications, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 896, 926-29 (1984).
176. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (general application of
objective good faith standard in constitutional tort suits).
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armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized groups. 1 7 It is
further suggested that judges, freed of social and political pres-
sure to avoid releasing the most serious criminals, would then
"be able to interpret more fully and honestly the command of
the fourth amendment in all the remaining cases."178
One objection to this approach is that-because the fourth
amendment does not distinguish between more and less serious
crimes-any such graded approach to applying the rules cannot
be justified on constitutional grounds.
3. Limiting the Exclusionary Rule on the Basis of the
Degree of Police Misconduct
A variation of the good faith idea is the notion that not all
fourth amendment violations are the same, or of the same seri-
ousness, and that the exclusionary rule should therefore not ap-
ply to all violations. Under this approach, the sanction of evi-
dence suppression would be reserved for only the worst search
and seizure violations." 9
One advantage of this approach is that police searches and
seizures could be evaluated in terms of how far they departed
from the standards of probable cause. Any clear evidence of bad
faith on the part of the police could become a "plus factor" con-
tributing to a decision to suppress the evidence.
Another advantage is that this approach would preserve some
aspect of the exclusionary rule's supposed deterrence and would
focus more attention on the most serious violations. It might
work best if it were combined with alternative sanctions in cases
where fourth amendment violations occurred but suppression
was not justified.
The disadvantages of this solution would include the difficulty
of drawing a line at which suppression could be justified. It
would, moreover, leave the exclusionary rule subject to most of
the same criticisms in those types of cases for which it would be
reserved as are made against the rule in its current form.
177. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974).
178. Id.
179. The American Law Institute MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 290.2 (1975) lists a number of factors a court might consider in deciding whether a
fourth amendment violation warrants suppression of the illegally seized evidence. The
factors include the extent of deviation from lawful conduct, the extent to which a per-
son's privacy has been violated, the willfulness of the violation, and the probability that
exclusion will prevent future violations. For a more complete discussion, see Schroeder,
supra note 108, at 1422-24.
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IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS
As the discussion in Parts II and III demonstrates, the man-
ner in which current law responds to the evidentiary, deterrent,
and remedial issues posed by unlawful searches and seizures is
irrational, costly, and ineffective. A more sensible approach is
needed. Ideally, such an approach would seek to achieve three
objectives: (1) relieving the criminal justice system of the many
burdens imposed by the exclusionary rule, while (2) still deter-
ring fourth amendment violations at an acceptable cost, and (3)
providing some means of compensation for persons injured by
unlawful searches. This section discusses these goals, some of
the steps that might be taken to achieve them, and the pros-
pects for success.
A. Abolishing The Exclusionary Rule
The first objective of reform-removing the many burdens im-
posed by the exclusionary rule-can be achieved only by abol-
ishing the rule.
1. The Case for Abolishing the Exclusionary Rule
To put it succinctly, the exclusionary rule imposes excessive
costs on the criminal justice system and on society in return for
benefits that-whatever their value-probably could be ob-
tained at a more reasonable price by other methods.
The exclusionary rule exists today principally, if not solely, to
deter unlawful searches and seizures, yet there is no persuasive
empirical evidence that it does, in fact, perform this function.
Certainly, there is a serious question whether investigative con-
duct, which often occurs under exigent circumstances, can be af-
fected significantly by the prospect of a court's future suppres-
sion of evidence. Be that as it may, it is plain that there is no
sound reason to suppress evidence obtained by a law enforce-
ment officer acting in a reasonable good faith belief that his con-
duct is lawful. As the Supreme Court stated in Leon: "[E]ven
assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct
and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a
whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it
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cannot be expected, and should not be applied to deter objec-
tively reasonable law enforcement activity."' 80 And, whatever
value the exclusionary rule may have as a deterrent to inten-
tional or reckless violations of the fourth amendment committed
solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence to support a crimi-
nal conviction,181 any such benefit is far outweighed by the rule's
undesirable consequences.
The immediate effect of the rule is to render useless in the
prosecution's case-in-chief reliable, probative evidence of guilt
that has been secured by means of an unlawful search, unless
the search was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated warrant. As a result, prosecutions are
declined when they would otherwise have been undertaken, the
charges filed against some defendants do not adequately reflect
the seriousness of their crimes, pleas are accepted to less serious
charges than would otherwise be warranted, and the suppression
of evidence may leave prosecutors with insufficient evidence to
obtain convictions. In short-because of the exclusionary
rule-some defendants either go scot-free or are not fully prose-
cuted, despite clear and reliable evidence of guilt. Thus, the rule
imposes a penalty upon the criminal justice system-and, ulti-
mately, on society-that is in many cases wholly out of propor-
tion to the gravity of the constitutional violation. 82
The collateral consequences of a rule requiring the exclusion
of such evidence are equally disturbing. Vast amounts of time
and energy are expended by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges on peripheral questions-relating to the way in which in-
vestigations were carried out-rather than on what should be
the central question-whether, on the basis of all probative and
reliable evidence available, the accused is guilty or not guilty.
Moreover, efforts by law enforcement officers and judges to
avoid the application of the rule may impair the integrity of the
criminal justice process and may even jeopardize fourth amend-
ment rights. In the interest of preserving the admissibility of
crucial evidence, some law enforcement officers may yield to the
180. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19.
181. Even in this context, the rule may be of little value. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("Suppressing unchallenged truth has set guilty criminals free but de-
monstrably has neither deterred deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment nor de-
creased those errors in judgment that will inevitably occur given the pressure inherent in
police work having to do with serious crimes.").
182. Cf. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 418-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to "the uni-
versal 'capital punishment' we inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its
acquisition").
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temptation to testify falsely concerning the circumstances at-
tending its acquisition, and some judges may be reluctant to re-
ject such testimony, or may take an unduly narrow view of
fourth amendment requirements. In any event, the rule subjects
the law and the judicial process to disrespect, if not ridicule, by
asking the public to accept the fundamentally illogical proposi-
tion that one wrong-a fourth amendment violation-deserves
another-exclusion of highly probative and reliable evidence of
guilt from criminal trials. 83
Abolition of the exclusionary rule would permit the use in
criminal prosecutions of relevant evidence-assuming it was oth-
erwise admissible-obtained through search and seizure, without
the necessity of conducting a simultaneous judicial inquiry into
the circumstances under which the evidence was acquired.184 By
obviating suppression hearings, this approach would also elimi-
nate or substantially reduce other disadvantages of the exclu-
sionary rule-particularly the time required to hear and rule on
fourth amendment challenges to the government's proof.185
Abolition of the exclusionary rule would not, of course, elimi-
nate the need for judicial scrutiny of alleged fourth amendment
violations-such scrutiny would continue, but in a civil forum."8 '
The question arises, therefore, whether there would be any real
saving of time and effort. It seems likely that there would be.
Many suppression motions are filed today, not because there has
been a fourth amendment violation, but simply because chal-
lenging the admissibility of proof of guilt is the only possible
"defense." When this incentive is removed, the number of fourth
amendment claims that are litigated is likely to drop
substantially.
Another factor that might reduce litigation is the difficulty
and cost of obtaining legal representation. Since claims will have
to be made in the context of civil proceedings, claimants will not
necessarily have the assistance of appointed counsel-as many
criminal defendants who file suppression motions now do. Some
183. To the ordinary citizen, it is incomprehensible that "[tihe criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered." People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (1926).
184. Even in the absence of the exclusionary rule, the Department might decide as a
matter of policy to continue voluntary exclusion of evidence obtained by means of inten-
tional fourth amendment violations.
185. The misallocation of scarce criminal justice resources that is caused by the sup-
pression doctrine is a subject that does not appear to have received adequate attention.
An empirical study of this matter by the Department of Justice could be helpful in sup-
porting an argument for complete abolition of the exlcusionary rule.
186. See generally infra Part IV.C.
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of those who cannot obtain free counsel will no doubt proceed
pro se, but others-particularly if their claims are frivolous or
marginal-may be discouraged by the prospect of having to pay
an attorney out of their own pocket. 187
Any approach less sweeping than complete abolition of the
rule would not be wholly satisfactory. For example, extension of
the "reasonable good faith" exception to cases involving war-
rantless searches would reduce the number of prosecutions in
which evidence is excluded, thereby increasing the number of
convictions and enhancing public respect for the law, but proba-
bly would not reduce significantly the number of suppression
hearings or related costs of the exclusionary rule.' The same
can be said of the approach under which the rule would be ap-
plied only in cases involving particularly serious fourth amend-
ment violations, since that is but a variant of the "reasonable
good faith" exception. Finally, the approach of suspending ap-
plication of the rule in prosecutions for especially grave offenses
would be very difficult to apply on an even-handed basis, and
would most likely reflect ad hoc judgments in particular cases.
2. The Prospects for Abolition
Because the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, the
Court can abolish the rule. It could also be abrogated by Con-
gress. There can be no sound constitutional objection to such
action by either body, since the rule is not required by the Con-
stitution, but is merely a judicially-created device for deterring
unlawful searches and seizures.'
Undoubtedly, the likelihood that either body would abandon
the exclusionary rule entirely would be enhanced by pointing to
the existence of an equally effective alternative. The essential
components of such an alternative are an effective disciplinary
mechanism to deter fourth amendment violations and an ade-
187. As noted below, if a new civil action were created to compensate victims of un-
lawful searches, it might limit recovery by convicted defendants to no more than out-of-
pocket losses. See infra Part IV.C.l.a-.b. This would provide an additional disincentive
to litigation of questionable claims.
188. As the Supreme Court recognized in Leon: "Although the exception might dis-
courage presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the magnitude of the benefit
conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely that litigation of color-
able claims will be substantially diminished." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924
n.25 (1984).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); S. Rep. No. 350, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1984).
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quate remedy for the victims of unlawful searches. It is argued
below that, although both could be improved, the necessary dis-
ciplinary provisions already exist in the federal system and fed-
eral civil remedies provide adequate redress and deterrence in
their present form.1 90
Assuming, therefore, that an equally effective alternative to
the exclusionary rule now exists (or could readily be created) in
the federal system, the question is whether Congress or the Su-
preme Court can be persuaded to abandon the rule. There ap-
pears to be a strong likelihood that the Senate would act favora-
bly if pressed to do so (though there is a possibility that harmful
amendments could be attached in committee), but there would
remain the formidable task of getting an abolition bill to a vote
on the floor of the House."" It might be easier, under certain
conditions, to persuade the Supreme Court to take the final
step. The Court would have sufficient justification to do so if the
Executive Branch were to demonstrate an impressive record of
the use of administrative action to prevent and punish fourth
amendment violations, and if it could be shown that federal civil
remedies created since Mapp provide adequate redress, as well
as additional deterrence and a fair opportunity for judicial scru-
tiny of questionable searches and seizures. Moreover, even if the
rule were further diluted by expansion of Leon to cover warrant-
less searches, abolition would be justified if experience demon-
strated continued significant burdens on the courts and the re-
lated costs resulting from the need to conduct and review
suppression hearings.
B. Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations
The second objective of a more sensible approach to fourth
amendment violations-deterrence of unlawful searches and
190. See infra Part IV.C.2.
191. Moreover, if the Supreme Court extends the Leon good faith exception to war-
rantless searches, the existing momentum for reform might be weakened considerably,
since the rule's principal undesirable consequences-the freeing or unduly lenient treat-
ment of obviously guilty defendants--would probably be reduced greatly. In that event,
arguments for complete abolition would have to be made primarily on the basis of the
other disadvantages of the exclusionary rule, including the adverse effects on the courts
of the continuing requirement of conducting and reviewing suppression hearings and the
diminution of the truth-seeking role. Finally, although these arguments would be appli-
cable to all cases, they would have to be made with respect to cases in which law enforce-
ment officers were not acting in an objectively reasonable belief that their conduct was
lawful.
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seizures-can be achieved by establishing a credible threat to
impose appropriate sanctions on federal law enforcement officers
who commit fourth amendment violations. As discussed above,
the principal methods that might be used to impose sanctions on
individual officers are disciplinary proceedings conducted by the
employing agency, civil actions for damages, and criminal
prosecutions. 19
While it might be appropriate to resort to criminal proceed-
ings in a particularly egregious case, such cases are extremely
rare, and less drastic and more easily imposed sanctions would
be preferable in the vast majority of cases. Civil damage actions
against the responsible officers meet these requirements but, as
noted above, they may also inhibit the officers from engaging in
lawful and desirable investigatory activity. Disciplinary proceed-
ings, on the other hand, can provide a direct and discriminating
method for imposing merited sanctions. Whether the threat of
disciplinary action would be regarded by law enforcement of-
ficers, Congress, and the Supreme Court as an acceptable and
adequate deterrent to fourth amendment violations would de-
pend on such factors as the nature of the process used to deter-
mine the existence of such violations, the impartiality of the fact
finder, and the degree to which violations result in the imposi-
tion of sanctions that are generally viewed as adequate under
the circumstances.
As discussed above, there already exists in the federal system
a variety of administrative requirements, policies, and practices,
including disciplinary provisions, designed to eliminate unlawful
searches and seizures. The possibility of improving these mecha-
nisms should not be overlooked, but it is equally important that
their existence and operation be more widely publicized. A
keener public appreciation of the comprehensive administrative
scheme that the federal government uses to prevent and punish
fourth amendment violations would certainly be helpful in es-
tablishing the proposition that this approach to deterrence is no
less effective-and much less costly-than the exclusionary rule.
Various steps might be considered to enhance the effective-
ness and credibility of existing administrative practices. For ex-
ample, the President or the Attorney General could announce
that, henceforth, a review board (perhaps located within the De-
partment of Justice) will investigate all questionable searches
and seizures conducted by federal law enforcement officers, and
impose appropriate disciplinary measures when warranted. Each
192. See supra PART III.B., PART III.C., & PART III.E.
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United States Attorney and federal investigative agency could
be directed to report such searches to the Department, and the
courts could be invited to do so as well. Investigations could be
triggered by such a report, by the filing of a citizen complaint or
a civil action for damages, or-so long as the exclusionary rule
remains in force-by a motion to suppress. The range of availa-
ble disciplinary actions could be publicized, and it could be an-
nounced that, as a matter of policy, some measure of discipline
would be imposed in every case in which the officer's action was
determined not to have been objectively reasonable.
C. Redressing Injuries Caused By Fourth Amendment
Violations
The third objective of a sensible approach to unlawful
searches and seizures is the provision of adequate compensation
to persons injured by fourth amendment violations. It is fre-
quently argued that existing remedies are inadequate,19 and
that attainment of this objective requires the creation of a new
federal cause of action against the United States. We initially
discuss in this part how such a new action might be designed.
However, as discussed below, an effort to establish a new civil
remedy would be fraught with difficulties and could yield unac-
ceptable results in terms of the scope of the government's liabil-
ity. On the other hand, the Department can argue that, although
existing federal remedies could be improved upon, they already
provide sufficient opportunities for redress in deserving cases, as
well as enough incremental deterrence, to be regarded-together
with the administrative practices discussed above-as an ade-
quate substitute for the exclusionary rule as it is likely to evolve
in the federal system.'" This argument is developed in the latter
portion of this part.
193. The limitations of existing civil remedies are discussed supra in Part III.E.
194. As the discussion below indicates, however, there is concern that existing causes
of action would not bring allegedly unlawful searches to the courts in sufficient numbers
to persuade the Supreme Court that such actions are a viable alternative to the exclu-
sionary rule. This concern might be addressed by altering existing causes of action some-
what to encourage their more frequent use in meritorious cases.
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1. A New Cause of Action
The primary purpose of creating a new cause of action would
be remedial, but any new remedy should, if possible, achieve
other important goals as well: eliminating the exposure of indi-
vidual agents to the risk of personal liability and providing de-
terrence through the enhanced likelihood of disciplinary action
in appropriate cases.
The latter objectives may be more easily attained than the
former. Federal agents can be shielded from individual liability
by providing an exclusive cause of action against the United
States for all unlawful searches and seizures (including illegal
electronic surveillance), by expressly precluding suits against in-
dividual federal law enforcement officers based on a Bivens the-
ory, and by repealing 18 U.S.C. § 2520. Added deterrence can be
achieved by requiring the employing agency to satisfy an award
of damages out of its own funds in cases involving fault on the
part of its employees. This requirement would create an addi-
tional incentive for agencies to train, supervise, and discipline
their employees in such a manner as to prevent the occurrence
of avoidable fourth amendment violations.
More difficult issues to resolve in creating a new civil remedy
relate to the scope of recovery, the types of plaintiffs who may
recover, the availability to the government of its employees' de-
fense of qualified immunity, and the mechanisms to be em-
ployed for determining the validity of challenged searches, as
well as for assessing damages and the need for disciplinary ac-
tion. Although a detailed examination of these issues is beyond
the scope of this Report, some discussion of the considerations
involved is warranted.
a. Scope of recovery- The principal questions concerning
the scope of recovery for fourth amendment violations are
whether liquidated damages should be awarded in cases in
which it is difficult or impossible to prove actual damages,
whether punitive damages should be permitted, and whether
awards of attorneys' fees should be allowed. Liquidated damages
may now be awarded against individual law enforcement officers
found liable in actions under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, and there ap-
pears to be no sound reason for not including a similar provision
in suits against the government." 6 Moreover, the prospect of at
195. The Administration's proposed Federal Tort Claims Act amendments-initially
included in Title XIII of the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 but
ultimately not adopted-would have provided successful plaintiffs with liquidated dam-
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least some recovery would provide an incentive to bring ques-
tionable searches and seizures to the attention of the appropri-
ate authorities. The greater that incentive, the less the justifica-
tion for relying on the exclusionary rule and suppression
motions to serve the same purpose.
The same rationale could be used to justify attorneys' fees
awards to successful plaintiffs.19 An additional justification is
the fact that fees are recoverable in suits against individuals
under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.197 On the other hand, permitting recov-
ery of attorneys' fees in addition to actual or liquidated damages
would be more costly for the government, might tend to invite
artful pleading aimed at converting ordinary tort claims into
constitutional tort cases, and could encourage the filing of frivo-
lous or malicious actions. On balance, we do not recommend any
expansion of fee shifting statutes.
Awards of punitive damages would also enhance the incentives
to sue for fourth amendment violations, but probably at a cost
that is excessive relative to the benefit. Although punitive dam-
ages may be awarded against individuals in Bivens suits, they
are not permitted in FTCA actions primarily because their bur-
den falls ultimately on innocent members of society rather than
on the individuals responsible for the government's wrongdoing.
For these reasons, and because agencies would have sufficient in-
centive to discipline errant employees under such a system, re-
covery of punitive damages should not be permitted.
b. Standing to sue- A difficult policy question that would
have to be resolved in creating a new civil damage remedy is
whether to authorize payment of damages to guilty defendants.
Such persons may now recover damages under either Bivens or
the FTCA. Bearing in mind that an important purpose of a new
remedy would be to provide a substitute to suppression hearings
as a means of raising claims of fourth amendment violations, it
would seem desirable to provide guilty defendants with some
material incentive to sue. On the other hand, it may be thought
inappropriate for the government to pay a person whose crimi-
nal activity created the need to conduct a search and seizure in
the first place. If this is a serious concern, one possible resolu-
tion would be to permit suits by convicted defendants, but to
ages of $1,000 in any case and up to $15,000 in cases involving continuing constitutional
torts.
196. But see infra note 210.
197. In actions against the government under the FTCA, fees are paid out of the
judgment for damages rather than being added to that award, and may not exceed 25%
of the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678.
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restrict their recovery to out-of-pocket expenses that would not
have been incurred had the government's conduct been lawful.
The difficulty with such a limitation, of course, would be
that-since few searches result in actual physical damage-it
would severely reduce the incentive of guilty persons to chal-
lenge questionable searches.
c. Availability of the good faith defense- Perhaps the most
difficult policy question to be resolved in attempting to structure
a new civil remedy against the United States for fourth amend-
ment violations is whether the government should be allowed to
assert as a defense the qualified immunity that would be availa-
ble to its employees if they were sued individually under a Biv-
ens theory or under 18 U.S.C. § 2520. As noted above, the
United States can now defend FTCA suits arising out of unlaw-
ful law enforcement behavior by proving that the conduct in
question was objectively reasonable.
We have previously argued forcefully in favor of retaining this
defense in the context of an improved remedy for fourth amend-
ment violations.1 9 8 Thus, we have claimed that imposing strict
liability on the United States, which would be the result of waiv-
ing the defense, in an area of the law that is frequently vague
and constantly shifting would be unfair and unwise because it
would result in liability for conduct that seemed entirely reason-
able at the time it occurred. We have also argued that imposing
strict liability would impair employee morale and inhibit reason-
able law enforcement behavior by treating reasonable conduct in
the same way as unreasonable behavior, and that it would pre-
clude thorough examination by the courts of all factors relevant
to the validity of allegations of official misconduct. 99
The arguments in favor of imposing absolute liability on the
government for fourth amendment violations also rely on con-
siderations of fairness. Thus, some have claimed that compensa-
tion should be provided whenever the government violates a
constitutional right because the government is the party whose
agents acted unlawfully and because-even though its agents
198. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 (S. 829), 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 87-91 (1984) (responses to Senator Biden's questions regarding torts claim
amendments).
199. These latter arguments assume that because the reasonableness of the agent's
conduct would not be relevant to the question whether the government is liable for dam-
ages, the agent's culpability would be totally irrelevant. That assumption would be incor-
rect if the new civil action required a determination by the court of the need to refer the
case to the employing agency when the fourth amendment violation appeared to involve
fault on the part of the agent.
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were not at fault-the government is better able than the per-
sons injured to absorb the loss.
Whatever the merit of these competing arguments, recent his-
tory suggests that the debate over whether to include the de-
fense of qualified immunity in a new fourth amendment action
against the United States would be decided on the basis of
broader considerations. Several years ago, in Title XIII of the
proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, the Admin-
istration proposed amendments to the FTCA that would have
created a civil remedy along the lines discussed here. 00 A key
feature of the Administration bill was that all defenses available
to the employee would continue to be available to the govern-
ment. During the course of consideration of the bill in the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees, it became apparent to the
Department that the House Committee would not accept this
limitation on the proposed remedy and that the Senate Commit-
tee would accept it only in part. As a result, fearing the passage
of a bill that would expose the United States to an unacceptable
level of liability, the Department decided to withdraw its sup-
port, and the bill died in the 98th Congress. Thus, any effort to
enact legislation addressing fourth amendment violations would
have to take into account this history of opposition.
d. Mechanism for identifying fourth amendment violations
and imposing sanctions- The combination of the deterrence
that would be provided through disciplinary proceedings and the
remedial provisions of a new civil action would be intended to
obviate the exclusionary rule. These measures would provide an
alternative method for subjecting a fair proportion of questiona-
ble searches and seizures to official scrutiny to decide whether
fourth amendment violations have taken place and, if so, what
the consequences should be. The remedial and disciplinary tasks
would be performed in separate proceedings: one conducted by a
court for the purpose of determining whether, and to what ex-
tent, the government is liable for damages, and the other con-
ducted by a Departmental review board or other administrative
entity to assess the need to impose disciplinary sanctions on the
responsible officers. For the reasons noted above, however, the
formulation of a new civil remedy presents a number of difficult
200. That proposal was motivated not by exclusionary rule considerations, but rather
by a desire to make the government the sole defendant in suits based on constitutional
torts committed by federal employees. However, the bill did include a provision that-in
cases in which damages were awarded against the United States-would have created the
possibility of disciplinary action against employees whose constitutional torts were not
committed in good faith.
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policy questions whose resolution would predictably be
controversial.
The difficulty of resolving the issues involved in creating a
new civil remedy to the satisfaction of the Department is not the
end of the matter. Even if an acceptable bill could be devised
and brought to a successful vote on the Senate floor, there would
remain the formidable hurdle of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. Since that body has shown no inclination toward diminution
of the scope of the exclusionary rule-to say nothing of aboli-
tion-it might resist efforts to establish an alternative remedy
that might ultimately lead to complete abrogation of the rule.
Moreover, although the Committee is likely to favor legislation
that provides an improved civil action for fourth amendment vi-
olations, it probably would add provisions-such as waiver of
the good faith defense-that would be unacceptable to the Ad-
ministration. The Committee might also include a proviso that
the new remedy is not intended to furnish a basis for displacing
the exclusionary rule as the sole deterrent to unlawful searches.
In either event, enactment of legislation satisfactory to the Ad-
ministration would depend on the Administration's ability to
persuade the full House or a conference committee to delete the
undesirable provisions.
2. Reliance on Existing Remedies
Given the difficulties of devising and obtaining passage of ac-
ceptable legislation to create a new civil remedy for fourth
amendment violations, it would be preferable to argue to the Su-
preme Court that existing federal remedies-when coupled with
sound administrative practices-provide an adequate alternative
to the exclusionary rule. Two considerations suggest that this
could be a fruitful approach: the enhancement of federal civil
remedies since Mapp, and the likely extension of the Leon good
faith exception to cases involving warrantless searches.
In Mapp, the Supreme Court buttressed its decision to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states by reference to "[t]he obvious
futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of
other remedies. ' ' 20 1 However, the remedial landscape has
changed considerably since Mapp. Within the federal jurisdic-
tion, it now includes such prominent features as Bivens suits,
FTCA actions, and suits under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, to say nothing
201. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
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of administrative requirements and sanctions. In addition, the
Supreme Court's decisions since the landmark 1961 decision in
Monroe v. Pape02 have revolutionized the law with respect to
the liability of state and local law enforcement officers for fourth
amendment violations.203
The Court has never been asked to consider the adequacy of
these remedies-either singly or in combination-as surrogates
for the exclusionary rule. Its closest approach to this question
was in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,204 and there it appeared to en-
dorse the adequacy of alternatives to the exclusionary rule. 0 5
What is particularly significant about Lopez-Mendoza in this re-
gard is that the alternatives cited by the Court-the administra-
tive requirements and practices of the INS and the possibility of
suits for declaratory relief against the agency-did not even in-
clude civil actions for damages. The Court's willingness to accept
these substitutes in the narrow context of deportation cases cer-
tainly suggests that, in the broader context of federal criminal
cases generally, it might be equally receptive to an approach
that offers, in addition to those alternatives, an even greater de-
terrent and remedial potential in the form of Bivens, FTCA, and
18 U.S.C. § 2520 actions.
The second factor that bodes well for an argument that ex-
isting federal civil actions provide an adequate remedial alterna-
tive to the exclusionary rule is the recent restriction of the rule
in Leon. In Leon, en route to its conclusion that the exclusionary
rule should not be invoked to bar admission of evidence ob-
tained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently in-
validated search warrant, the Court explicitly endorsed the pro-
position that the exclusionary rule cannot be expected to deter
objectively reasonable investigative activity by law enforcement
officers.2 Although the decision not to apply the exclusionary
rule under such circumstances was made in the context of a
search conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Court's logic seems
to compel the same result in cases involving warrantless
searches. If the Court does extend the Leon exception to war-
202. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
203. See generally supra Part III.E.4.
204. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
205. In partial justification for its conclusion that the exclusionary rule should not be
applied in civil deportation proceedings, the Court cited the fact that "the INS has its
own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers,"
and added that "the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings
is undermined by the availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices by
the INS that might violate Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 1044-45.
206. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984).
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rantless searches, the rule will apply only to fourth amendment
violations resulting from law enforcement conduct that is not
objectively reasonable. In other words, the rule will be applied
only for the purpose of deterring objectively unreasonable law
enforcement activity.
Such a development could have a great bearing on perceptions
of the adequacy of current federal civil remedies for fourth
amendment violations. One of the principal drawbacks of these
existing causes of action from the point of view of potential
plaintiffs is that they provide no remedy in cases in which the
law enforcement officers acted in good faith. Once it is firmly
established that the exclusionary rule exists only to deter what
amount to bad faith violations of the fourth amendment, this
will no longer be a valid criticism of the adequacy of these civil
actions as an alternative to the rule. In that event, the kinds of
violations that will trigger application of the exclusionary
rule-bad faith violations-will be the same types of violations
for which such suits permit the recovery of damages. Moreover,
given the identical focus of the two types of responses to fourth
amendment violations, it will be easier to compare their
strengths and weaknesses in other respects bearing upon the
question whether one is an adequate substitute for the other.
As regards this question, it seems clear that civil suits consti-
tute a more rational and a more equitable response to unlawful
searches and seizures than does the exclusionary
rule-particularly when they are used as a complement to effec-
tive prophylactic and punitive administrative measures. Without
affecting the integrity of criminal prosecutions or otherwise
demeaning the criminal justice process, civil suits-particularly
FTCA actions-can provide innocent as well as guilty victims of
fourth amendment violations with an opportunity to secure an
award of actual damages in a neutral forum and against a finan-
cially responsible defendant. Moreover, if plaintiffs are dissatis-
fied with that remedy and think they can collect a judgment for
punitive damages from the responsible officers, they have the
option of suing those individuals under Bivens additionally, or
alternatively.0 7
Nevertheless, despite the obvious superiority of civil suits in
these respects, there is one aspect of the exclusionary rule that
they may not be able to duplicate. This is the suppression doc-
207. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). However, a judgment for the plaintiff
under the FTCA would preclude a Biven.s award against the individual officers. See 28
U.S.C. § 2676.
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trine's function as a vehicle for bringing before the courts novel
questions of fourth amendment law and, thereby, providing op-
portunities for judicial guidance concerning the lawfulness of in-
novative search and seizure practices. Whether existing civil
remedies can reasonably be counted on to perform this service
will depend on two factors: the number of cases in which it is
arguable that a fourth amendment violation occurred as a result
of objectively unreasonable law enforcement conduct and the
strength of the incentives (or disincentives) for victims to sue for
damages in such cases.
To elaborate, because plaintiffs will have to overcome the
good faith defense, the only FTCA or Bivens suits that they are
seriously likely to consider bringing are those in which it is argu-
able that an unlawful search or seizure occurred and that the
officers' conduct was not objectively reasonable, and in which ac-
tual damages were sustained. However, because of the costs and
risks of litigation, not all cases meeting these requirements will
be pursued. Thus, the number of fourth amendment claims
presented to the courts certainly will be smaller than the num-
ber raised by means of suppression motions today. 0 8 The largest
category of situations in which civil damages will not be sought
will be those involving insubstantial fourth amendment claims
or clearly reasonable law enforcement conduct. Elimination of
litigation in these situations will certainly be a wholly desirable
result. However, some plaintiffs will forego suit not because their
claims lack merit, but because of insufficient incentive to bring
those claims to the attention of the courts. In the case of ordi-
nary civil litigation, such a result might be inequitable to the
injured party, but not intolerable to society. Here, however, be-
cause constitutional protections are involved, the interest of so-
ciety as well as of the individual may be jeopardized by a sub-
stantial reduction in the incentives for litigating arguable fourth
amendment issues.
The possibility that the substitution of existing civil remedies
for suppression motions would lead to a significant diminution
in opportunities for the courts to review genuine fourth amend-
ment questions might well give the Supreme Court pause.0 9
208. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. Under the current system, as
the Supreme Court pointed out in Leon, "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on
defendants by a successful [suppression] motion" creates a tremendous incentive to liti-
gate fourth amendment claims. 468 U.S. at 924 n.25.
209. In Leon, the Court was confronted with arguments that adoption of a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in warrant cases would preclude review of the consti-
tutionality of searches and seizures, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze
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Two steps could be taken to alleviate the Court's concern in this
regard. The first would be for the Department to demon-
strate-by means of an empirical study of all instances of alleg-
edly unlawful searches or seizures that come to its atten-
tion-that every arguable fourth amendment violation results in
an administrative investigation, that appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion is taken when warranted, and that civil suits for damages
are filed in a fair proportion of cases in which it appears that
serious and unjustified violations may have occurred. Such a
showing would support the conclusion that a reduced level of
judicial oversight is not likely to result in a significant dilution
of fourth amendment protections.
The second initiative that could be taken to dispel doubts
concerning the utility of civil suits as vehicles for judicial review
of search and seizure practices is to amend the FTCA to permit
awards of liquidated damages. 10 Enhancing the attractiveness of
FTCA actions in this manner would give greater assurance that
legitimate fourth amendment claims will be presented to the
courts rather than abandoned because their pursuit would not
be economical. To be sure, allowance of liquidated damages
would impose an additional burden on the federal treasury.
However, if the government's administrative practices work ef-
fectively to prevent bad faith violations of the fourth amend-
ment, the number of cases in which the United States will be
found liable will not be great, nor will this burden be heavy.
Whatever the weight of the burden, morever, the ultimate ques-
tion for the government is whether it would be more than offset
by relief from the burdens imposed by the exclusionary rule.
Given the very substantial social costs of the rule, this cost of its
abolition does not seem excessive.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The development and application of the exclusionary rule in
the United States are at odds with and undermine a number of
fourth amendment law in its present state. The Court rejected these arguments, pointing
out the discretion of reviewing courts to decide suppression motions on the basis of the
fourth amendment issues involved if that course appears desirable. 468 U.S. at 925. Of
course, abolition of suppression motions would remove this opportunity.
210. As noted above, the FTCA amendments proposed in the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1983 would have allowed awards of liquidated damages. See supra note
195. Another potential enhancement would be the award of attorneys' fees. The Depart-
ment, however, has long opposed the expansion of fee shifting statutes and we do not
recommend the inclusion of attorneys' fee provisions in this context.
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important criminal justice goals. These include establishing the
truth in criminal cases, protecting the public from obviously
guilty defendants, maintaining the integrity and credibility of
the criminal justice system, and achieving a rational allocation
of scarce criminal justice resources. The problems caused by the
exclusionary rule are particularly intolerable in light of the
availability of alternative means to reasonably guard against and
redress fourth amendment violations. Accordingly, we recom-
mend that the Department seek complete abolition of the exclu-
sionary rule from federal and state proceedings. This goal should
be pursued through a comprehensive program of legislative, liti-
gative, and administrative initiatives.
A. Legislative Initiatives
The Department should take two steps. First, it should en-
courage an amendment to S. 237, the principal exclusionary rule
bill now pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. In its
present form, that bill would establish a statutory exception to
the rule in cases in which a search or seizure was conducted in
an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that it was lawful.
The Department has previously supported this approach, but we
should now make clear our preference for outright abolition of
the exclusionary rule, and should seek an amendment to the
bill-in the nature of a substitute-to that end. 11 Even if this
approach does not succeed, we are not likely to lose any votes in
favor of the "good faith" approach, as a majority of the Commit-
tee has previously indicated a preference for even more substan-
tial limitations on the rule. In any event, if this recommendation
is adopted, we must act immediately, since Committee action on
the bill is expected in the near future.
Second, we should continue to support amendments to the
FTCA along the lines we proposed in the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1983,211 to make the United States the exclusive
defendant in suits based on constitutional torts committed by its
employees. This would provide a remedy that would be more
useful and more likely to be perceived as an adequate substi-
211. Although the hearings that have been held on S. 237 and on earlier exclusionary
rule bills probably have created a record that would support abolition of the rule, the
,Committee may wish to hold an additional hearing on this specific point if the proposed
amendment is offered. In that event, the Department could provide testimony explaining
its preference for a more complete reform measure.
212. See supra note 195.
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tute-at least in part-for the exclusionary rule. However, it
would not be desirable to deprive the United States of the de-
fense of qualified immunity now available to its employees in
Bivens and most FTCA suits. Moreover, once it is clear that the
exclusionary rule exists only to deter bad faith searches and
seizures, it will also be clear that civil actions where liability is
limited to bad faith cases provide an adequate remedial substi-
tute for the rule, and that a civil remedy involving a more liberal
scope of liability is unnecessary. Therefore, the Department
should continue to resist the creation of any new civil remedy
for fourth amendment violations that provides recovery for ac-
tions taken in good faith.
B. Litigative Initiatives
The Department should argue that, in view of the ineffective-
ness of the exclusionary rule, the viability of alternatives, and
the Supreme Court's decisions since Mapp emphasizing the non-
constitutional status of the rule, the Court should cease to re-
quire application of the exclusionary rule in federal or state
prosecutions. With respect to federal prosecutions, we should
endeavor to bring before the Court a case that squarely raises
the issue of the rule's viability in a situation in which the "good
faith" exception would not be available. If possible, this should
be a case in which the officer thought he was acting properly but
his belief was found not to be objectively reasonable, and in
which he was sued and subjected to administrative sanctions. In
such a case, we should argue that existing-or appropriately
modified-federal administrative practices and civil remedies
provide adequate deterrent and remedial substitutes. 15
We should also seek to participate as an amicus in appropriate
state challenges to the exclusionary rule in the Supreme Court.
213. Another argument that might be made is that-regardless of the wisdom of the
rule-the Court lacks the power to impose it even in the federal system. Such an argu-
ment would require careful analysis of the Court's ill-defined "supervisory power" over
lower federal courts, an exercise that is beyond the scope of this Report. In essence, the
argument would have two prongs. The first point would be that the Court has no com-
mon law authority to establish rules of evidence for use in federal courts and that, even
if it had such power, the power would be limited to the prescription of rules designed to
ensure the accuracy of the fact-finding process, a goal that the exclusionary rule plainly
does not serve. The second point would be that the existence of such limited authority to
lay down rules of evidence (assuming that it does exist) does not permit the Court-in
the guise of performing that function-to control the behavior of Executive Branch
officials.
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The first argument to make in such an amicus brief is that the
Court has no power to require state courts to exclude evidence
on the basis of fourth amendment violations because the Court's
"supervisory power" does not extend to state courts. 1 4 Second,
we should argue that-apart from the question of power-as a
matter of policy the rule should no longer be imposed on the
states. Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and relevant state law, to-
gether with appropriate administrative practices and remedies,
provide sufficient deterrence and remedies for fourth amend-
ment violations by state law enforcement officers to justify aban-
donment of the exclusionary rule on policy grounds.
C. Administrative Initiatives
The Department should undertake a series of administrative
initiatives to (1) ensure that federal law enforcement agents con-
tinue to adhere to constitutional requirements, and (2)
strengthen its position in future debates over the exclusionary
rule. To begin with, the Department should begin an "outreach"
program designed to publicize the effectiveness of existing ad-
ministrative practices in preventing unlawful searches and
seizures, and punishing the responsible employees when they are
at fault.
Second, the Department should review existing administrative
practices to determine whether they might be strengthened
without detriment to effective law enforcement. One step in this
direction would be to explore, with other federal departments
and agencies having law enforcement authority, the possibility
of creating a Justice Department Review Board-perhaps sim-
ply by expanding the jurisdiction of the Department's Office of
Professional Responsibility-to examine and take appropriate
administrative action with respect to all questionable searches
and seizures by federal law enforcement officers.
Third, the Department should commission or undertake em-
pirical research concerning two questions bearing on the future
of the exclusionary rule in both federal and state courts-the
use and effectiveness of existing civil remedies for fourth amend-
ment violations, and the degree to which the resolution of sup-
pression issues burdens courts and prosecutors' offices. A dem-
214. See supra Part 11.C; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 1, The Law of Pretrial Interrogation,
Part I. C.1 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437, 526-27 (1989).
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onstration that the existing remedies are utilized with
reasonable frequency and with success in deserving cases would
make a strong case for their value as a partial substitute for the
exclusionary rule. Moreover, an empirical demonstration of the
unconscionable expenditure of justice system resources on sup-
pression motions-even under a diluted exclusionary
rule-would provide convincing support for the argument that
the rule is too costly in any form.
In sum, complete elimination of the exclusionary rule from
federal and state criminal proceedings is a worthy and attainable
goal. It should be pursued through a program of initiatives along
the lines recommended above.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1989] Search and Seizure 655
APPENDIX A: TEXT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED EXCLUSIONARY RULE CASES
The exclusionary rule has been criticized for causing the re-
lease of individuals who were clearly guilty but whose convic-
tions were based on evidence obtained in a manner that was
later held to violate fourth amendment search and seizure stan-
dards. This appendix presents some illustrative cases in which
appellate courts reversed or vacated and remanded convictions
on the grounds that evidence used to convict in the trial court
should have been suppressed.
1. United States v. Gillespie215 - FBI and local police ar-
rived at the home of Gillespie armed with arrest warrants for
fugitives believed to be inside. Gillespie admitted the officers
and accompanied them on a room-by-room search. No fugitives
were found, but contraband (heroin) was discovered. More her-
oin was seized during two subsequent searches, Gillespie freely
consenting to both. Notwithstanding these facts, the Seventh
Circuit reversed Gillespie's conviction. The appeals court said
that because the FBI and local police officers were armed with
shotguns and revolvers when they appeared at Gillespie's door,
"Gillespie could only have felt he had no choice but to let in the
officers." The court held that the first search was illegal, and
that the second and third searches, although freely consented to,
were "entirely the product of the first unconstitutional search."
Accordingly, all of the drugs seized were inadmissible.
2. United States v. Sanchez-Jarami~lo"- INS agents, act-
ing with probable cause, arrested Sanchez on a charge of coun-
terfeiting alien registration cards. After being arrested, Sanchez
consented to a search of his apartment. During the search the
agents found Cruz in a bedroom, read him his Miranda rights,
and told him to sit in the living room with Mr. and Mrs.
Sanchez while they continued to search. Two locked suitcases
were then found in the bedroom where Cruz had been sleeping.
Cruz told the agents they belonged to him. At the agents' direc-
tion Cruz opened the suitcases. Cash and materials used to
counterfeit alien registration cards were found inside. Cruz was
then arrested. He was later convicted. The Seventh Circuit over-
turned the conviction. The court held that the agents lacked
probable cause to detain Cruz, and that any "consent" Cruz gave
for the search of the suitcases was ineffective, as it could not be
215. 650 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
216. 637 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862 (1980).
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sufficiently voluntary to purge the "taint" of the illegal deten-
tion. The court held that both the evidence in the suitcases and
the statements made by Cruz subsequent to the search should
have been suppressed.
3. United States v. Perez-Esparza2 17- An informer who had
previously supplied the DEA with reliable information twenty
out of twenty-five times tipped them that a specific car was be-
ing used to smuggle narcotics from Mexico into the United
States. Border Patrol agents subsequently stopped the car and
detained the driver, Perez-Esparza, for two and one-half hours
until DEA agents arrived. Perez-Esparza was then read the Mi-
randa warnings, told that he was being detained on suspicion
that his car was transporting narcotics, and further told that
agents were obtaining a warrant for a search of the car. Perez-
Esparza then gave both oral and written consent to a search of
the car. The search uncovered cocaine. After again being warned
of his rights, Perez-Esparza confessed.
The Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction. The court rea-
soned that while the informer's tip provided a sufficient basis for
officers to stop the car and question its driver, it did not support
probable cause for an arrest. Thus, the two and one-half hour
wait for DEA agents to arrive was an illegal "arrest," rendering
the suspect's consent to the search of his car ineffective, even
though the court agreed the consent was fully "voluntary." All
evidence stemming from the defective consent to the search was
therefore suppressed.
4. United States v. Lockett218 - Federal agents acting pursu-
ant to a search warrant found eighty-five sticks of dynamite
stored on the premises of Lockett, who was subsequently con-
victed. The conviction was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit,
which found that the affidavit supporting the warrant did not
allege sufficient facts for a magistrate to conclude that explosives
were stored on the specific property searched. This despite the
fact that the affidavit did aver (1) that Lockett had purchased a
case of dynamite on a specific date, (2) that Lockett had made
several threats against his former employers and had mentioned
explosives in such threats, and (3) that a bomb made of the
same type of dynamite as that purchased by Lockett had been
discovered at a facility of his former employer sixty miles from
Lockett's home.
217. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
218. 674 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1982).
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5. People v. Trudeau 19- A night watchman was killed by
crowbar blows to the head during the attempted burglary of a
Michigan synagogue. A heel print at the scene was one of the
few leads. Approximately two weeks later Trudeau was arrested
in a United States Post Office where he had attempted to break
and enter a vault. Because of the similarity of the crimes a
detective assigned to the murder case went to the preliminary
hearing on the Post Office case in order to view the defendant's
shoes. Later the same day at the jail, Trudeau refused to turn
over his shoes to the police. Acting without a warrant, officers
removed the shoes and gave them to the detective. Trudeau was
convicted at trial in part due to expert testimony comparing the
seized shoes with the print. The Michigan Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that there
was no probable cause and no warrant for the seizure, and that
the shoes were therefore taken in violation of the fourth amend-
ment and should not have been allowed in evidence.
The following case involves evidence thrown out at the prelim-
inary hearing phase.
People v. Padilla & Corona220- California narcotics detec-
tives arrested a couple for possession of narcotics. The suspects
had a nine-month-old baby with them, in whose diapers the
detectives found heroin. At a preliminary hearing in the case a
judge threw out the evidence because "a baby has the rights of a
person, and must therefore be afforded the protection of the
Constitution." The judge said that since a nine-month-old was
too young to consent to a search, the evidence must be sup-
pressed and the case dismissed.
219. 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
220. Cal. Mun. Ct., Dec. 29, 1970.
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APPENDIX C: A BRIEF NOTE ON Mapp v. Ohio
Dollree Mapp was convicted for possession of obscene materi-
als, found in her home during a search by Cleveland police. The
police were interested in obtaining information relating to an ex-
tortionist bombing. Dollree Mapp was believed to be the girl-
friend of one of the men associated with the crime. She had ear-
lier been arrested in another county and had given police a
statement on the involvement of several men in the extortion
scheme. However, she subsequently pled the fifth amendment
and refused to testify in court against the men she had named.
When the police went to Mapp's home they believed the
bomber might be hiding inside. Upon arrival, the police knocked
and demanded entrance. After telephoning an attorney, Mapp
refused to admit them without a search warrant. The officers ad-
vised their headquarters of the problem and set up watch
outside the house. In the meantime an affidavit was prepared
but the police were unable to locate a judge and get a warrant.
About three hours after the initial try at entry, more officers
arrived at the house, armed with the affidavit but no warrant.
Police then forced their way into the house and showed Mapp
the affidavit, which she took from them and placed "in her bo-
som". A struggle ensued, and the police recovered the affidavit.
They then searched the house, finding not the bombing suspect
but the obscene materials.221
In her appeal to the Supreme Court Mapp did not urge that
Wolf v. Colorado be overruled. Indeed, the Supreme Court in its
opinion chose not to address any of the issues Mapp raised. In-
stead, the Court observed in a footnote that this exclusionary
rule issue had been raised only by an amicus curiae in the case.
But the Court disposed of the case entirely on the exclusionary
rule ground, stating that the issues actually raised by Mapp
"need not be decided. '222
221. The facts described in the preceding paragraphs have been gleaned from the
Mapp opinion, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the transcript of an interview between Eugene
H. Methvin, now a senior editor at Reader's Digest, and John Corrigan, Cleveland Dis-
trict Attorney at the time of Mapp, conducted in 1966. A copy of this transcript is in the
possession of the Office of Legal Policy.
222. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3.
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